On uniqueness of time-consistent Markov policies for quasi-hyperbolic consumers under uncertainty

• Autorzy: Łukasz Balbus , Łukasz Woźny
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We give a set of sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a time-consistent Markov stationary consumption policy for a quasi-hyperbolic household under uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, this uniqueness result is the first presented in the literature for general settings, i.e. under standard assumptions on preferences, as well as some new condition on a transition probability. This paper advocates a "generalized Bellman equation" method to overcome some predicaments of the known methods and also extends our recent existence result. Our method also works for returns unbounded from above. We provide few natural followers of optimal policy uniqueness: convergent and accurate computational algorithm, monotone comparative statics results and generalized Euler equation. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Consumer; Uncertainty; Bellman equation; Comparative statics

PL

Konsument; Niepewność; Równanie Bellmana; Statyka porównawcza

• Czasopismo: Collegium of Economic Analysis SGH - Working Papers
• Rocznik: 2016
• Numer: nr 20
• Strony: 21

Twórcy

autor

Łukasz Balbus

• University of Zielona Góra, Poland

autor

Łukasz Woźny

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

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