Regulatory Reforms to Deal with Information Overload in Financial Services : Insights from Behavioural Economics

• Autorzy: Magdalena Dziedzic
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Consumer protection regulation is based on the assumption that the communication of sufficient information to consumers enables them to protect themselves against unfair business practices and the consequences of making uniformed decisions. As one may presume, imperfectly informed consumers are unable to contract in their own best interests. It is a common belief, however, that providing the consumers with too much information at one time, so that it goes beyond their processing capacities may lead to inefficient and inaccurate performance. Disclosure of information plays a key role in the regulation of financial markets, but to make the disclosing regime efficient, there is a need to take into consideration the cognitive capacities, personal biases, heuristics and their influence on the decision making process. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Behavioural finance; Financial services; Consumer

PL

Finanse behawioralne; Usługi finansowe; Konsument

• Czasopismo: Rozprawy Ubezpieczeniowe
• Rocznik: 2018
• Numer: nr 2(28)
• Strony: 3--11

Twórcy

autor

Magdalena Dziedzic

• Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland

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