Efficiency as a New Ideology of Trust-Building Corporate Governance

• Autorzy: Maryna Brychko , Andrii Semenog
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Though the ideology of efficiency has been investigated for many centuries, still it has not gained a clear definition and interpretation either in the scientific literature, or in the practice of corporate governance. This paper seeks to examine the mainstream theories of corporate governance in an attempt to suggest that efficient corporate governance has no logical claim to "objectivity" and it does not always contribute to trust-building. The purpose of this paper is to explore the ideology of efficiency, both with respond to its inconsistency and incoherence within trust-building corporate governance. The results suggest that efficiency is ideological and political concept that fails in repairing the breach of trust-building corporate governance. The efficiency as a new ideology of trust-building corporate governance promises to advance our understanding of corporate purpose beyond the old "shareholders-versus-stakeholders" and "shareholders-versus-society" debates. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Confidence building; Effectiveness; Shareholder Value (SHV); Ideology

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Budowanie zaufania; Efektywność; Wartość dla akcjonariuszy; Ideologia

• Czasopismo: Business and Economic Horizons
• Rocznik: 2018
• Numer: vol. 14, iss. 4
• Strony: 913--925

Twórcy

autor

Maryna Brychko

• Sumy State University, Ukraine

autor

Andrii Semenog

• Sumy State University, Ukraine

Bibliografia

• Adams, R., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: a conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 58-107.
• Anson, M., White, T., & Ho, H. (2004). Good corporate governance works: more evidence from CalPERS. Journal of Asset Management, 5(3), 149-156.
• Barniv, R., Myring, M. J., & Thomas, W. B. (2005). The association between the legal and financial reporting environments and forecast performance of individual analysts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 22(4), 727-758.
• Bebchuk, L. A., & Roe, M. J. (1999). A theory of path dependency in corporate ownership and governance. Stanford Law Review, 52, 127-170.
• Bednar, M. (2012). Watchdog or Lapdog? A behavioral view of media as a corporate governance mechanism. Academy of Management Journal, 55(1), 131-150.
• Berle, A. (1965). Property, production and revolution. Columbia Law Review, 65(1), 1-20.
• Beyer, J. M. (1981). Ideologies, values, and decision-making in organizations. In P. Nystrom, & W. Starbucks, Handbook of Organizational Design (pp. 166-202). New York: Oxford UP.
• Bhat, G., Hope, O., & Kang, T. (2006). Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts? Accounting and Finance, 46, 715-732.
• Black, J. (2002). Regulatory conversation. Journal of Law and Society, 29(1), 163-196.
• Bromley, D. W. (1990). The ideology of efficiency: searching for a theory of policy analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 19, 86-107.
• Coffee, J. C. (2001). The rise of dispersed ownership: The roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. Yale Law Journal, 111(1),, 1-82.
• Cioffi, J. W. (2009). Legal regimes and political particularism: an assessment of the "legal families" theory from the perspectives of comparative law and political economy. Brigham Young University Law Review, 6, 1501-1552.
• Collin, S.-O. (1998). Why are these islands of conscious power found in the ocean of ownership? Institutional and governance hypotheses explaining the existence of business groups in Sweden. Journal of Management Studies, 35(6), 719-746.
• Conyon, M., Judge, W. Q., & Useem, M. (2011). Corporate governance and the 2008-09 financial crisis. Corporate Governance: An international Review, 19(5), 399-404.
• Demeter, T. (2012). Weltanschauung as a priori: sociology of knowledge from a 'romantic' stance. Studies in East European Thought, 64(1/2), 39-52.
• Donaldson, L. (1990). The ethereal hand: organizational economics and management theory. Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 369-381.
• Donaldson, L. (2005). For positive management theories while retaining science: Reply to Ghoshal. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4(1), 109-113.
• Dyck, A., Volchkova, N., & Zingales, L. (2008). The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Finance, 63(3), 1093-1093.
• Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
• Fauver, L., & Fuerst, M. E. (2006). Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 673-710.
• Fine, G. A., & Sandstrom, K. (1993). Ideology in action: a pragmatic approach to a contested concept. Sociological Theory, 11(1), 21-38.
• Fitzgerald, N. (2003). CSR: rebuilding trust in business. A perspective on corporate social responsibility in the 21st Century. London, UK: Unilever and London Business School.
• Gapper, J. (2005). Comments on Sumantra Ghoshal's "Bad management theories are destroying good management practices". Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4(1), 101-103.
• Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4(1), 75-91.
• Guerrero, S., & Séguin, M. (2008). Corporate governance ideologies and tasks involvement among boards of directors: the example of a financial cooperative. Actes du congrès de l'ASAC, Halifax, 86-107.
• Hambrick, D. C. (2005). Just how bad are our theories? A response to Ghoshal. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4(1), 104-107.
• Ireland, P. (1999). Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership. The Modern Law Review, 62(1), 32-57.
• Jonnergård, K., & Larsson, U. (2007). Developing codes of conduct: regulatory conversations as means for detecting institutional change. Law and Policy, 29(4), 460-492.
• Kanter, R. M. (2005). What theories do audiences want? Exploring the demand side. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 93-95.
• La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Sheifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155.
• La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 55(1), 1-33.
• Lang, M., Lins, K., & Miller, D. (2004). Concentrated control, analyst following, and valuation: do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of Accounting Research, 42, 589-623.
• Lazonick, W., & O'Sullivan, M. (2002). Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate governance. Economy and Society, 29(1), 13-35.
• Lins, K., Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2017). Social capital, trust, and firm performance: The value of corporate social responsibility during the financial crisis. Journal of Finance, 72, 1785-1824.
• Maug, E. (1997). Boards of directors and capital structure: alternative forms of corporate restructuring. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 113-139.
• McKinley, W., Mone, M. A., & Barker, V. L. (1998). Some consequences of an ideological spirit of downsizing. Journal of Management Inquiry, 7, 198-212.
• McShane, M., Nair, A., & Rustambekov, E. (2011). Does enterprise risk management increase firm value. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 26(4), 641-658.
• Myrdal, G. (1969). Objectivity in social research. New York: Pantheon Books.
• Nelson, J. (2005). Does good corporate governance really work? More evidence from CalPERS. Journal of Asset Management, 6(4), 274-287.
• Nenova, T. (2003). The value of corporate voting rights and control: a cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(3), 325-351.
• Nielson, N. L. (2005). The evolution of the role of risk communication in effective risk management. Risk Management and Insurance Review, 8(2), 279-289.
• O'Sullivan, M. (2003). The political economy of comparative corporate governance. Review of International Political Economy, 10(1), 23-72.
• Oxelheim, L., & Randøy, T. (2005). The Anglo-American financial influence on CEO compensation in non-Anglo-American firms. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(4), 470-483.
• Petry, S. (2009). The wealth effects of labor representation on the board-evidence from German codetermination legislation. Working Paper, University of Cambridge.
• Pfeffer, J. (2005). Why do bad management theories persist? A comment on Ghoshal. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4(1), 96-100.
• Power, M. (2009). The risk management of nothing. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6-7), 849-855.
• Roe, M. J. (2002). Can culture constrain the economic model of corporate law? The University of Chicago Law Review, 69(3), 1251-1269.
• Roy, A. D. (1952). Safety first and the holding of assets. Econometrica, 20(3), 431-49.
• Sacconi, L., & Antoni, G. D. (2011). Social capital, corporate responsibility, Economic Behaviour and Performance. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
• Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997, June 2). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.
• Stafsudd, A. (2009). Corporate networks as informal governance mechanisms: A small worlds approach to Sweden. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(1), 62-76.
• Stout, L. (2012). The shareholder value myth: how putting shareholders first harms investors, corporations, and the public. Oakland, California: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
• Weber, M. (1904/1949). Objectivity in social science and social policy. In E. A. Finch, The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Free Press.
• Westphal, J., & Deephouse, D. (2011). Avoiding bad press: Interpersonal influence in relations between CEOs and Journalists and the consequences for press reporting about firms and their leadership. Organization Science, 22(4), 1061-1086.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.15208/beh.2018.62