The Impact of Standardised fiscal rules index on the Yield on Ten-Year Government Bonds in the Visegrád Group Countries in 2005-2016

• Autorzy: Marta Postuła , Jarosław Klepacki , Agnieszka Alińska
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Purpose: The article analyzes the possible methods of public debt management, which not only aim to meet regulatory requirements but also obtain a market premium in the form of an optimal level of the yield on government bond yields that will be profitable for the issuer. The study analyzes the situation in the public finance sector in the countries that form the Visegrád Group (V4). The authors evaluate the main regulatory requirements of EU law in the area of numerical fiscal rules and their impact on the yield on basic securities such as ten-year government bonds, which directly influences the cost of servicing long-term public debt.

Methodology: The study uses desk research method for theoretical reasoning to verify the research hypothesis. The study seeks to answer the question of whether the application of national and EU fiscal rules in V4 budgetary frameworks contributes to lower yields on ten-year bonds and thereby reduces the cost of public debt. The authors utilize time series and cause-effect analysis as well as quantitative research for the systematization of statistical information and regression analysis for the examination of statistical dependencies.

Findings: The basic parameters subject to financial assessment within the fiscal rules index are (1) the deficit of public finance sector and (2) public debt with its servicing costs. In 2005-2016, the ratio of the public finance sector deficit to GDP was shaped in such a way that most V4 countries required the institution of excessive deficit procedures and further disciplinary regulations. The assessment of the situation in the public finance sector in the area of budget deficit and public debt does not translate into the yield on government bonds of non-Eurozone countries. Model-based testing indicates that the financial markets - when deciding to evaluate or purchase government bonds of non-Eurozone countries - failed to acknowledge the implementation of fiscal rules in these countries and its possible effects.

Originality: The study focuses on a unique comprehensive analysis of national fiscal rules employed in individual V4 countries and their impact on the yield on government bonds throughout the entire EU membership of the V4. What holds the greatest cognitive value in this article is the answer to the question of whether Eurozone membership impacts the valuation of a country's public debt. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Bond yield; Public debt; Fiscal rules

PL

Rentowność obligacji; Dług publiczny; Reguły fiskalne

• Czasopismo: Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: 26
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 49--70

Twórcy

autor

Marta Postuła

• University of Warsaw, Poland

autor

Jarosław Klepacki

• University of Social Sciences, Poland

autor

Agnieszka Alińska

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7206/jmba.ce.2450-7814.325