Zarządzanie długiem publicznym w USA - wybrane problemy

• Autorzy: Arkadiusz Babczuk

Warianty tytułu

Public Debt Management in the U.S. - Selected Problems

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest prezentacja najistotniejszych zmian w zakresie procedur emisyjnych amerykańskich skarbowych papierów wartościowych, obserwowanych w ostatnich piętnastu latach. Dotyczyły one zasad przeprowadzania przetargów na rynkowe skarbowe instrumenty dłużne. Analiza doświadczeń amerykańskich w tych obszarach może stanowić jedną z przesłanek podejmowania decyzji w zakresie przekształceń instrumentarium zarządzania długiem publicznym w Polsce. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The subject of the following article is to present the most significant changes in the field of issuing procedures for American Treasury Securities over the period of the past 15 years. The changes concerned the rules of auctions of marketable treasury securities. As a result of the analysis of contemporary studies as well as experiments carried out by American public debt managers, the auction procedures has changed from multiple-price sealed bid auction into uniform-price sealed bid auction. The above mentioned changes are aimed at the reduction of U.S. public debt costs. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dług publiczny; Zarządzanie długiem

EN

Public debt; Debt management

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr 1129 Współczesne problemy polityki ekonomicznej
• Strony: 256--265

Twórcy

autor

Arkadiusz Babczuk

• Akademia Ekonomiczna we Wrocławiu

Bibliografia

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