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2018 | nr 1-2 (96-97) | 93--126
Tytuł artykułu

On Two Modes of Appraisal of Economic Models

Treść / Zawartość
Warianty tytułu
O dwóch trybach oceny modeli ekonomicznych
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
Ekonomia stała się nauką opartą na metodzie modelowej. Modelowanie ekonomiczne, obejmujące zarówno konstruowanie modeli, jak i ich ocenę, wymaga znajomości formalnych procedur oraz nieformalnego rzemiosła. W związku z tym cel niniejszego artykułu jest podwójny. Po pierwsze, wpisanie się w dyskusję dotyczącą praktyki modelowania ekonomicznego przez zasygnalizowanie funkcjonowania dwóch nieformalnych trybów oceny modeli. Będzie to oznaczać omówienie propozycji Dani'ego Rodrika dotyczącej nieformalnej sztuki selekcji modeli, która wywołała pogłębione komentarze filozoficzne i stała się obiektem formalnych rekonstrukcji dokonanych przez metodologów ekonomii. Po drugie, uzupełnienie tego ujęcia poprzez przygotowanie gruntu pod rekonstrukcję odrębnego trybu oceny modeli wyrażającego się w nieformalnej sztuce krytyki modeli.(abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
Economics became a model-based science. As economic modeling, namely model- building and model-appraisal, involves both informal craft and formal procedures, the aim of the article is twofold. Firstly, to enter into the discussion about the practice of economic modeling by drawing attention to the possibility of two implicit modes of model appraisal in economic science. We will start with a thought-provoking recent proposal by philosophically and methodologically sensitive economist Dani Rodrik, whose insights into the art of model selection has already triggered a number of in-depth philosophical commentaries, and has been the subject of a few successful formal reconstructions by philosophers of economics. Secondly, the aim is to supplement this philosophical view of model selection with an account that aims at underlabouring for the reconstruction of a distinct implicit mode of model criticism, which for various reasons has been pretty much absent in recent philosophical and economic discussions.(original abstract)
Twórcy
  • Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
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