Efekty skali w finansowaniu projektów inwestycyjnych na rynku kapitałowym

• Autorzy: Paweł Lubecki

Warianty tytułu

Economies of Scale in Financing Investment Projects in the Capital Market

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest pokazanie na podstawie aktualnych badań teoretycznych i empirycznych, w jaki sposób budowanie infrastruktury rynku kapitałowego napotyka problem wynikający z immanentnej charakterystyki mikroekonomicznej sektora pośrednictwa inwestycyjnego i ewentualne nakreślenie sposobów rozwiązania tego problemu. (fragment tekstu)

EN

A modern economic growth theory postulates an existence of causal relationship between capital markets development and economic growth. The main role of capital market is aggregation of information about investment projects, ivhich facilitates efficient capital allocation. However, capital markets are based on relationship banking in their main function - the process of investment intermediation. Building a relationship banking is not fully scalable. The investment intermediation process tends to a model of natural oligopoly, with heave dependence upon the size of the corporate sector. A microeconomic analysis of the investment intermediation sector leads to unexpected practical conclusions, which are supported by empirical observations. It seems that the smaller number of large firm, the lower probability for an efficient capital market to emerge. To effectively deal with scale effects, an institutionalized private equity sector appears to be the best solution. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Efekt skali; Projekty inwestycyjne; Rynek kapitałowy

EN

Economy of scale; Investment project; Capital market

• Czasopismo: Organizacje Komercyjne i Niekomercyjne wobec Wzmożonej Konkurencji i Rosnących Wymagań Konsumentów
• Rocznik: 2004
• Tom: 3
• Strony: 449--462

Twórcy

autor

Paweł Lubecki

• Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu - National-Louis University w Nowym Sączu

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