Enhancing Prudent Fiscal Policy

• Autorzy: Grzegorz Poniatowski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The objective of this paper is to derive the characteristics of an effectivegovernance framework ensuring incentives for conducting a prudent fiscal policy.We study this problem with the use of econometric tools and a sample of 28European Union Member States between 2003 and 2017. By looking at specificreforms and measures, not only we verify the synthetic effectiveness of fiscalconstraints but also we analyse specific elements of the governance framework.Our study shows that fiscal balances are affected not only by the economic cycle,but, among others, by the level of public debt and its cost. We find that theexistence of numerical fiscal rules, in that specifically revenue and expendituresrules, their strong legal entrenchment, surveillance mechanisms, sanctions, andflexibility with respect to business cycle have a significant impact on curbingdeficits. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Fiscal rules; GARCH model; Bayesian inference

PL

Reguły fiskalne; Model GARCH; Wnioskowanie bayesowskie

• Czasopismo: Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics (CEJEME)
• Rocznik: 2019
• Tom: 11
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 199--215

Twórcy

autor

Grzegorz Poniatowski

• Center for Social and Economic Research; Warsaw School of Economics

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

DOI: 10.24425/cejeme.2019.131537