Wage Versus Efficient Bargaining in a Cournot Duopoly: a Preliminary Note on Welfare

• Autorzy: Domenico Buccella
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In a unionized Cournot duopoly with decentralized, firm-level bargaining, this note re-examines the endogenous equilibrium agendas wage vs. efficient bargaining that can arise under three different specifications of the timing of negotiations and the impact of the outcome of the bargaining process on social welfare. Given that explicit conflict of interest among the bargaining parties can arise in every timing specification, this note proposes, analyzes, and discusses some guiding principles for governments and public authorities interested in pursuing social welfare improvements. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Social welfare; Collective bargaining; Imperfect competition

PL

Dobrobyt społeczny; Negocjacje zbiorowe; Konkurencja niedoskonała

• Czasopismo: Ekonomia - Wroclaw Economic Review
• Rocznik: 2019
• Numer: tom 25, nr 1
• Strony: 23--34

Twórcy

autor

Domenico Buccella

• Kozminski University, Poland

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.19195/2084-4093.25.1.2