Ratio optimal de la garantie de crédit

• Autorzy: Cheikh Tidiane Ndour , Mouhamadou Bamba Diop

Warianty tytułu

Optimal Ratio of Credit Guarantee in Senegal

• Języki publikacji: FR

Abstrakty

La mise sur place d ' un fond de garantie est une option permettant aux États d ' assurer un financement pérenne des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (PME). L ' asymétrie d ' information entre les préteurs et emprunteurs et l ' absence de garantie sont entre autre les principales causes du rationnement du crédit. Dans cet article, on s ' intéresse, dans un premier temps, aux facteurs qui explique le ratio optimal de la garantie de crédit. L ' analyse des résultats du modèle théorique montrent que le niveau de la garantie optimale dépend de l ' objet du gouvernement en termes de cible de crédit, de la stabilité financière des banques et de l ' environnement économique. En outre, à partir d ' un Modèle vectoriel à Correction d ' erreur, nous avons cherché la réponse du risque de défaut de crédit suite à un choc non anticipé de la croissance économique, de la dette publique, du taux d ' inflation, de la disponibilité monétaire (masse monétaire), du taux d ' intérêt, des prêts des banques et des fonds propres des banques. Les résultats ont montré un effet positif du risque de défaut suite à un choc sur l ' inflation, sur la croissance de la masse monétaire. L ' effet est négatif suite à un choc sur la croissance économique, des fonds propres, de la dette publique et des prêts.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The establishment of a guarantee fund is an option allowing States to ensure sustainable financing for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). The asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers and the lack of collateral are, among other things, the main causes of credit rationing. In this article, we first look at the factors that explain the optimal ratio of the credit guarantee. The analysis of the results of the theoretical model shows that the level of the optimal guarantee depends on the purpose of the government in terms of credit target, the financial stability of the banks and the economic environment. In addition, from an Error Correction Vector Model, we looked for the credit default risk response following an unanticipated shock of economic growth, public debt, inflation, monetary availability (money supply), interest rate, bank loans and banks ' own funds. The results showed a positive effect of the risk of default following a shock on inflation, on the growth of the money supply. The effect is negative following a shock on economic growth, equity, public debt and loans.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Credit guarantee; Guarantee; Loans; Bank loans; Banks

PL

Gwarancje kredytowe; Gwarancja; Pożyczki; Pożyczki bankowe; Banki

• Czasopismo: Revue Internationale des Economistes de Langue Française : revue de l'Association Internationale de Economistes de Langue Française avec la collaboration Université des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
• Rocznik: 2019
• Tom: 4
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 72--92

Twórcy

autor

Cheikh Tidiane Ndour

• Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar

autor

Mouhamadou Bamba Diop

• Senegal Direction Generale

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