The Effect of Agency Relationships and Individual Ethical Ideology on Decision Duplication with Regard to Questionable Accounting Policy Choice : an Experimental Study

• Autorzy: Ewa Wanda Maruszewska

Warianty tytułu

Wpływ relacji agencji i indywidualnej ideologii etycznej na powielanie decyzji dotyczących wątpliwego wyboru polityki rachunkowości : badanie eksperymentalne

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Recent studies confirm that the principal-agent relationship adversely affects managers' decisions. This study experimentally investigates willingness to copy a decision that is ethically suspect in both high and low adverse selection criteria. It revealed that when the agency problem was observed, the respondents were less eager to misuse accounting discretion within foreign currency. It showed that without adverse selection criteria, respondents behave unreflectively, duplicating a choice to the detriment of financial reporting. The findings were also compared with Forsyth's taxonomy of personal moral philosophies, which show that most respondents represent the situationist and absolutist orientation, while situationists and exceptionists are less prone to misbehave. It suggests that individual moral orientation has an unexpectedly small impact, whereas witnessing the agency relationship tends to make subjects duplicate the choice described in the scenario to a lesser degree. Idealists are more severe in ethical evaluation com-pared to relativists, although the majority of respondents, who did not observe adverse selection conditions, showed a high propensity to would duplicate the misconduct. The most important variable is the existence of adverse selection criteria, indicating that decision-making and the choice of professionals lie at the heart of accounting policy choice, and that further research should be considered. (original abstract)

Literatura prezentująca wyniki badań eksperymentalnych w rachunkowości potwierdza, że występowanie relacji pryncypał - agent niekorzystnie wpływa na decyzje menedżerów. W artykule zaprezentowano wyniki eksperymentu, w którym badano skłonność do powielenia wątpliwego etycznie zachowania w sytuacji występowania/braku relacji agencji. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują, że wcześniejsza obserwacja niewłaściwego wyboru w ramach polityki rachunkowości przy występowaniu relacji agencji zmniejsza skłonność do powielenia dyskrecjonalnych wyborów w zakresie wyceny rozrachunków w walutach obcych. Wykazano też, że bez niekorzystnych kryteriów podejmowania decyzji respondenci zachowują się bezrefleksyjnie, powielając dokonany wybór ze szkodą dla sprawozdawczości finansowej. Otrzymane wyniki porównano z taksonomią osobistych filozofii moralnych Forsytha wykazując, że większość badanych to sytuacjoniści i absolutyści oraz sytuacjoniści i utylitaryści są najmniej skłonni do powielania nieprawidłowej decyzji. Wyniki sugerują, że indywidualna orientacja etyczna ma bardzo mały wpływ, podczas gdy wcześniejsza obserwacja kwestionowanej decyzji w warunkach agencji zmniejsza skłonność badanych do powielenia decyzji. Idealiści są bardziej surowi w ocenie moralnej sytuacji w porównaniu z relatywistami, chociaż większość ankietowanych, którzy nie obserwowali negatywnych skutków relacji pryncypał - agent, wykazała wysoką skłonność do powielania niewłaściwego zachowania. Najważniejszą zmienną jest występowanie relacji agencji wskazując, że podejmowanie decyzji i indywidualne wybory praktyków stanowią ważny element tworzenia polityki rachunkowości i wymagają badań. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Accounting policy; Agency theory; Value and ethical norms

PL

Polityka rachunkowości; Teoria agencji; Wartości i normy etyczne

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Teoretyczne Rachunkowości
• Rocznik: 2020
• Tom: 107
• Numer: nr 163
• Strony: 159--182

Twórcy

autor

Ewa Wanda Maruszewska

• University of Economics in Katowice, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0014.2468