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2020 | nr 3 | 35--52
Tytuł artykułu

A New Instrument for Measuring the Local Causal Effect of Privatisation on Firm Performance

Warianty tytułu
Wykorzystanie nowego instrumentu do lokalnego pomiaru wpływu prywatyzacji na wyniki przedsiębiorstw
Języki publikacji
Despite an apparent consensus in the literature that privatisation universally leads to an increase in firm performance, the problem of endogeneity bias is profound and has been emphasised in a number of meta-analyses. We propose a new instrument to address the endogeneity bias and apply it to Polish medium-sized and large firms in the period of 1995 to 2008. We find that improvements in firm performance are not universal; in particular, we find no improvement among manufacturing firms privatised to domestic investors.(original abstract)
Pomimo istnienia w literaturze ewidentnego konsensusu, że prywatyzacja jednoznacznie prowadzi do wzrostu produktywności i zyskowności przedsiębiorstw, problem obciążenia estymatorów wywołany endogenicznością jest znaczny, co potwierdzają liczne metaanalizy. W artykule zaproponowano nową metodę rozwiązującą problem endogeniczności, którą stosuje się do danych o uniwersum polskich średnich i dużych przedsiębiorstw w latach 1995-2008. Rezultaty estymacji wskazują, że wywołana prywatyzacją poprawa wyników przedsiębiorstw widoczna jest jedynie w niektórych ich grupach. (abstrakt oryginalny)
Opis fizyczny
  • University of Warsaw, Poland; CASE - Center of Social and Economic Research, Poland
  • University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, Poland; FAME|GRAPE, Warsaw, Poland; IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany
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