Basic Income Guarantee in the Perspective of Institutional Economics
The main problem of this article is the basic income guarantee in the perspective of institutional economics. The author evaluates theoretical literature considering the topic and discusses past empirical research. The predicted and the actual outcomes of the programme are compared and synthesized using the New Institutional Economics framework. Hence the basic income guarantee is presented as a social policy proposition, and also as an institution in the meaning of this branch of economics. Originality of this approach relies on the novel use of institutional tools in the discussion considering the problem, mainly in the context of the empirical and theoretical results' comparison. (original abstract)
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