Banki na progu upadłości - refleksje nad postępowaniem

• Autorzy: Andrzej R. Stopczyński

Warianty tytułu

Banks Likely to Fail - Thoughts on Conduct

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Koncepcja resolution banków (postępowania z bankami na progu upadłości), zakładająca rozszerzenie odpowiedzialności za niewypłacalność instytucji finansowej na jej wierzycieli, wydawała się praktycznym rozwiązaniem chroniącym państwa przed koniecznością wykorzystania środków publicznych do utrzymania stabilności prywatnego (w większości) sektora bankowego. Podejście to, wzbudzające jednak wiele kontrowersji, przynosi inne zagrożenia, które mogą istotnie utrudnić rozwiązanie problemu upadającego banku. W artykule autor koncentruje się na ocenie wiarygodności mechanizmów wprowadzonych przez regulacje europejskie. Autor podejmuje próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy regulacje europejskie ograniczają pokusę nadużycia w sektorze bankowym oraz czy mogą być skuteczne w poszczególnych segmentach sektora bankowego. Głównym przedmiotem badań jest znaczenie dyscypliny rynkowej w planowaniu i przeprowadzeniu resolution banku oraz wpływ zakresu umorzeń zobowiązań banku na poziom tej dyscypliny. W oparciu o analizę przypadków resolution w reżimie Dyrektywy BRRD sformułowane zostały wnioski dotyczące możliwości przeprowadzenia potencjalnych procesów resolution w odniesieniu do różnych grup banków w Polsce. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The concept of resolution (actions taken with respect to the failing bank) assuming that banks at risk of default can be resolved with the extended involvement bank's creditors (but without involving public funds), seemed to be a practical solution enhancing the stability of the banking sector. That approach, however still controversial, brings essential disadvantages and can meet some impediments hampering the bank resolution. The article focuses on the credibility of the resolution mechanism introduced by the European regulations. The author makes an attempt to answer whether that approach mitigates the moral hazard in banking sector, and is credible for certain classes of banks. The main subject of the research is the importance of the market discipline for the planning and executing the bank resolution, as well as connections between the extent of writing-off bank liabilities and the discipline level. Based on the findings in recent resolution cases (in EU), the author presents the feasibility assessment of the potential resolution with respect to specific types of banks in Poland. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Upadłość banku; Niewypłacalność; Koszty; Restrukturyzacja banków; Likwidacja banków; Dyscyplina rynkowa; Regulacje bankowe; Pokusa nadużycia

EN

Bank bankruptcy; Insolvency; Costs; Banks restructuring; Liquidation of banks; Market discipline; Bank regulations; Moral hazard

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2020
• Numer: nr 5
• Strony: 517--548

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej R. Stopczyński

• Uniwersytet Łódzki

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