How the Possibility of a Fight-Back Strategy Affects the Consequences of a Sanctions Regime

• Autorzy: Mohammad Sadegh Karimi , Abbas Malek , Asieh Haieri Yazd
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Sanctions imposed by a country against another country are considered as a foreign policy tool. Many studies have investigated different aspects of sanctions including the efficacy of sanctions to alter the target country's behaviour. However, the effects of a potential fight-back strategy adopted by a target country have been discussed rarely. In this paper, the outcomes of a possible fight-back strategy are simulated using game theoretical analysis. To find the matching state of game theory and sanction regimes, we have conducted a critical and systematic review of 12 sanctions, from 1950 to 2012. The results show that the capability of a target country to implement fight-back strategies provides the opportunity to change the sender's expected outcomes. It also makes the occurrence of future sanctions less probable or even less feasible. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Game theory; Economic sanctions; International politics

PL

Teoria gier; Sankcje gospodarcze; Polityka międzynarodowa

• Czasopismo: Journal of International Studies
• Rocznik: 2020
• Tom: 13
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 264--279

Twórcy

autor

Mohammad Sadegh Karimi

• Sharif University of Technology, Iran

autor

Abbas Malek

• Sharif University of Technology, Iran

autor

Asieh Haieri Yazd

• University of Dundee, UK

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14254/2071-8330.2020/13-3/17