Impact Différencié de la Politique Monétaire Commune sur les États Membres d'Une Union Monétaire : Cas de la CEMAC

• Autorzy: Antoine Ngakosso

Warianty tytułu

Differentiated Impact of the Common Monetary Policy on the Member States of a Monetary Union : Case of CEMAC

• Języki publikacji: FR

Abstrakty

L ' objet de cet article est d ' analyser les désajustements que pourrait générer la politique monétaire commune de la CEMAC dans la stabilisation macroéconomique dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre de la règle de Taylor standard par la Banque Centrale des Etats de l ' Afrique Centrale (BEAC). Estimant d ' une part, une règle de Taylor par pays calée sur les seules conditions économiques nationales, et d ' autre part, une autre avec des données agrégées pour l ' ensemble des pays, il est apparu que la décision de politique monétaire de la BEAC est calée sur des grandeurs globales de l ' union dont le but prioritaire est le maintien de la parité fixe de sa monnaie avec l ' euro. Ainsi, sa politique monétaire a une efficacité limitée du fait des effets asymétriques de la politique monétaire commune. A cet effet, la BEAC devra renforcer sa politique monétaire par des politiques budgétaires nationales concertées, mener des réformes structurelles, mettre en place un budget fédéral et une union bancaire plus poussée, ainsi que respecter les exigences du triangle d ' incompatibilité du Mundell ou opter pour un régime de change flexible.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

This paper analyses the misalignments that could result from the common CEMAC monetary policy under macroeconomic stabilization in case of the implementation of the standard Taylor rule by the Central Bank of Central African States (BEAC). Considering a Taylor rule per country solely based on national economic conditions, on the one hand, and another with aggregate data for all countries on the other hand, it transpired that the BEAC ' s monetary policy decision depends on the overall size of the union, whose priority goal is to maintain the fixed parity of its currency with the euro. Thus, its monetary policy has limited efficiency in macroeconomic stabilization due to the asymmetric effects of the common monetary policy. In fact, the BEAC should strengthen its common monetary policy by coordinating national budgetary policies, carry out structural reforms, set up a federal budget and a banking union, obey the Mundell incompatibility triangle or choose a flexible exchange rate regime.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Unobserved heterogeneity; Theories of economic stabilization; Taylor rule; State monetary policy; Monetary unions

PL

Nieobserwowalna heterogeniczność; Teorie stabilizacji gospodarczej; Reguła Taylora; Polityka pieniężna państwa; Unie monetarne

• Czasopismo: Revue Internationale des Economistes de Langue Française : revue de l'Association Internationale de Economistes de Langue Française avec la collaboration Université des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
• Rocznik: 2020
• Tom: 5
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 104--125

Twórcy

autor

Antoine Ngakosso

• Université Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville

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