Economic Sanctions Outcomes: An Information-Driven Explanation

• Autorzy: Mehmet Onder
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Economic sanctions are long-lasting crises between states. Does the exchange of information between the sender and target state impact economic sanction outcomes and durability of economic sanctions? In this article, we answer these questions by presenting a theoretical model leading to expectations regarding the influence of relative capability differentials between sanctioning dyads and political stability of target states on economic sanction outcomes. To account for this, we examine variables related to political, economic, and geographical factors. Our findings indicate that although the relative power is significant, its effect on successful economic sanction outcomes is limited. We also find that political stability in the target state and economic costs borne by the target state due to economic sanctions are two important factors for successful economic sanction outcomes. This shows that successful economic sanction outcomes depend on factors related to target state characteristics. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Economic sanctions; International politics; Economic policy of the EU

PL

Sankcje gospodarcze; Polityka międzynarodowa; Polityka gospodarcza UE

• Czasopismo: Journal of International Studies
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: 14
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 38--57

Twórcy

autor

Mehmet Onder

• Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti,USA

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14254/2071-8330.2021/14-2/3