An Accounting-based Model of Seigniorage, and Recent Monetary Developments

• Autorzy: Zbigniew Polański , Mikołaj Szadkowski

Warianty tytułu

Model księgowy senioratu : analiza renty menniczej w kontekście niekonwencjonalnej polityki pieniężnej

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The aim of this paper is to identify the changes of seigniorage during 2003-2019 in a group of central banks. To achieve this we propose an accounting-based model of seigniorage creation and distribution. It is used to research the developments in seven monetary areas (i.e. of the euro area, Japan, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US). We show that the post-2007 period differs substantially from the earlier one with respect to most variables of the model, which can be attributed above all to the implementation of unconventional monetary policies. Our estimates, based on a dataset compiled especially for the study, suggest that there was a break following the Great Financial Crisis as the share of seigniorage in central banks' profits declined noticeably. On the distribution side, we observed an increase in average central bank transfers to governments in all larger economies in 2008-2019. Central banks' finances in the three smaller economies (Poland, Sweden, Switzerland), however, markedly diverged from those of monetary authorities' in larger economies, particularly after 2007. (original abstract)

Celem opracowania jest rozpoznanie sytuacji w zakresie kształtowania się senioratu (renty menniczej, emisyjnej, monetarnej) we współczesnych uwarunkowaniach pieniądza kredytowego i rozwiniętych rynków finansowych, przy wykorzystaniu modelu księgowego jego powstawania i alokacji. Rozważania przeprowadzamy na dwóch płaszczyznach. Na pierwszej dokonujemy analizy teoretycznej, prowadzącej do sformułowania modelu, który jest podstawą dalszych badań. Na drugiej dokonujemy analizy empirycznej tworzenia i podziału senioratu w wybranych bankach centralnych w latach 2003-2019. Jako punkt wyjścia proponujemy księgowy model powstawania i alokacji senioratu w powiązaniu z kształtowaniem się wyniku finansowego banku centralnego. Wychodzimy z trzech przesłanek: (1) kredyt bankowy jest ostatecznym źródłem pieniądza; (2) powstawanie senioratu wiąże się z gospodarką finansową banków centralnych, w tym z ich monopolem na emisję prawnego środka płatniczego, jakim jest nieoprocentowana gotówka; (3) bank centralny ma tzw. niezależność finansową, tzn. ma dostateczne zasoby kapitałowe do realizacji swoich funkcji oraz kontroluje swój budżet (nie finansuje więc działalności typowej dla polityki fiskalnej, np. nie udziela subsydiowanych kredytów).(skrócony abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Central banks; Profit; Seigniorage; NBP monetary policy; Negative interest rate; Research results

PL

Banki centralne; Zysk; Renta mennicza; Polityka pieniężna NBP; Ujemna stopa procentowa; Wyniki badań

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2021
• Numer: nr 5
• Strony: 391--435

Twórcy

autor

Zbigniew Polański

• SGH Warsaw School of Economics

autor

Mikołaj Szadkowski

• SGH Warsaw School of Economics

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