The concept of political instability in economic research

• Autorzy: Łukasz Jannils
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article reviews the use of the concept of political instability in economic research, the importance of which has been growing in recent years due to its potentially profound economic consequences. The article explores this concept by working through the definitions, dimensions, and methods of quantification. It also summarizes the results of the theoretical and empirical research on the economic implications of political instability. In contrast with the previous literature reviews, this article is not limited to the relationship between of political instability and one specific macroeconomic phenomenon but intends to summarize the findings of the research regarding its impact on a variety of economic phenomena investigated in the literature. The review covers the most influential publications in this area characterized by formulation of original research hypotheses, use of novel datasets, and development of innovative research methods. The research reviewed shows that political instability has a detrimental effect on economic growth, investment, inflation, fiscal deficits, public debt, and the functioning of financial markets.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Economic growth; Political economy; Inflation; Public debt

PL

Wzrost gospodarczy; Ekonomia polityczna; Inflacja; Dług publiczny

• Czasopismo: International Journal of Management and Economics
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: 57
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 268--284

Twórcy

autor

Łukasz Jannils

• CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.2478/ijme-2021-0016