An Impact of the First and Second-largest Shareholders on a Catering Effect: Evidence from Poland

• Autorzy: Aleksandra Pieloch-Babiarz
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Motivation: Dividend pay-out is a frequently undertaken research issue. However, there is no study on the impact of concentrated ownership on adjustment of dividend amount to investor sentiment for pay-outs. The paper contribute to the literature by filling the research gap regarding the catering effect in the context of principal-principal agency conflict and type II agency costs, monitoring hypothesis and expropriation hypothesis. Aim: The aim of the article is to investigate an impact of the first and second-largest shareholders on an adjustment of dividend pay-outs to investor sentiment for dividends. To achieve the aim, two hypotheses have been formulated, i.e. H1: if the first-largest shareholder is a strategic investor, a catering effect weakens; H2: an existence of significant second-largest shareholder moderates the extent to which companies cater to investor sentiment for dividends. Results: There are three main finding: 1) the number of shares held by the first-largest shareholder is lower in dividend payers, while the number of shares held by the second-largest shareholder is lower in dividend non-payers; 2) listed companies from electromechanical industry sector cater to investor sentiment for dividends; 3) both research hypotheses have not been satisfied. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Dividend; Ownership; Agency theory

PL

Dywidenda; Prawo własności; Teoria agencji

• Czasopismo: Ekonomia i Prawo
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: 20
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 353--366

Twórcy

autor

Aleksandra Pieloch-Babiarz

• University of Lodz, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

https://doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2021.021