Iterative Monotone Comparative Statics

• Autorzy: Łukasz Balbus , Kevin Reffett , Łukasz Woźny , Wojciech Olszewski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

For an increasing upper order hemi-continuous correspondence F : A ⇒ A, where A a σ-complete lattice, we first provide tight fixed-point bounds for sufficiently large iterations Fk(a0), starting from any point a 0 ∈ A. We use this result for conducting iterative fixed-point comparative statics, and then apply our results to monotone games and economies. For games of strategic complementarities, we improve the correspondence principle based results of Echenique (2002) by allowing for divergent learning processes, unstable fixed points, equilibrium indeterminacies, and unordered perturbations. We also apply our results to the comparative statics of stationary equilibria in large economies and the set of recursive equilibria in macroeconomic models with indeterminacies. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Studying; Cooperative game; Adaptive learning; Strategic games; Comparative statics

PL

Uczenie się; Gry kooperacyjne; Adaptacyjne uczenie się; Gry strategiczne; Statyka porównawcza

• Czasopismo: Collegium of Economic Analysis SGH - Working Papers
• Rocznik: 2022
• Numer: nr 72
• Strony: 36

Twórcy

autor

Łukasz Balbus

• University of Zielona Góra, Poland

autor

Kevin Reffett

• Arizona State University, USA

autor

Łukasz Woźny

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

autor

Wojciech Olszewski

• Arizona State University, USA

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