Recent Trends in Regulatory Design - Stakeholder Engagement in Regulatory Impact Assessment

• Autorzy: Renata Śliwa
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: Justification of stakeholder engagement as a possible pillar of efficient regulatory governance.
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: To visualize the significance of stakeholder engagement to regulation, the OECD data on stakeholder engagement are interpreted. Then, the case studies of the stakeholder engagement within regulatory impact assessment procedures in the European Union, Korea and the United Kingdom are highlighted. The methodology is based on the comparative analysis of the OECD secondary data and case study comparative analysis.
THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: Starting from a view of regulatory policy as the realization of policy goals with regulation, law, and other instruments through which a higher standard of living of the population can be achieved. Concluding with the reasoning that stakeholder engagement is a crucial component of a check-and-balance mechanism in regulatory governance.
RESEARCH RESULTS: The stakeholder-engagement-driven three-layer division covers: Policy-driven layer (strategy) determined by the contemporary challenges stemmed from emancipation of association consciousness and movements and ICT revolution; Administration-driven layer (operationalization) determined by effectiveness and efficiency as well as public service imperatives; Governance-driven layer serving as the exponent of varieties of conflicting and complementing ideas and interest of social groups, check and balance in the process of monitoring, legitimization and accountability of regulators while wide-spreading the essential public services.
CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Stakeholder engagement as a crucial part of regulatory impact assessment has been the pivotal element of the systemic adjustments reaching out to the behavioral adaptations, and to the institutionalization of evidence-based policy making. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Stakeholders; Regulatory policy; Interest group; Theory of regulation

PL

Interesariusze; Polityka regulacyjna; Grupa interesu; Teoria regulacji

• Czasopismo: Horyzonty Polityki
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: 13
• Numer: nr 42 Instrumenty regulacyjne a skuteczność polityk publicznych
• Strony: 91--107

Twórcy

autor

Renata Śliwa

• Pedagogical University of Cracow

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.35765/HP.2177