Armenia in a Triangle of Great Power Management: Regional Competition on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

• Autorzy: Harutyun Voskanyan

Warianty tytułu

Armenia w trójkącie zarządzania mocarstw: regionalna rywalizacja na tle konfliktu w Górskim Karabachu

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The aim of the article is to examine the foreign policy approaches and interests of three regional powers - Iran, Russia and Turkey before the Second Karabakh war in 2020. The study argues that dissatisfaction with the results of the conflict, forced these countries to further advance their interests in the region through cooperation and regional influence by soft power rather than waging an unpredictable geopolitical confrontation. The study is based on the methods of foreign policy analysis and comparative analysis of political discourse of the three regional powers in application to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict using the Great Power Management (GPM) approach of the English School of International Relations. The study puts forward the idea that the predominance of the national interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran, disguised with ideational concepts in the framework of the GPM is fundamentally different from the principles of multilateralism, driven by the European Union and the West within the liberal paradigm of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.(original abstract)

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie interesów i podejść w polityce zagranicznej trzech mocarstw regionalnych - Iranu, Rosji i Turcji na tle konfliktu w Górskim Karabachu w 2020 roku. W badaniu autor weryfikuje tezę, że w efekcie konfliktu ww. państwa zmieniły metody realizacji swoich interesów w regionie na współpracę opartą o instrumenty soft power. Tym samym odeszły od prowadzenia nieprzewidywalnej konfrontacji geopolitycznej. Badanie opiera się na metodach analizy polityki zagranicznej i analizy porównawczej dyskursu politycznego trzech mocarstw regionalnych w zastosowaniu do konfliktu w Górskim Karabachu z wykorzystaniem podejścia Great Power Management (GPM) angielskiej szkoły stosunków międzynarodowych. Autor dochodzi do wniosku, że dominacja interesów narodowych Rosji, Turcji i Iranu, zamaskowana ideowymi koncepcjami w ramach GPM, zasadniczo różni się od zasad multilateralizmu, którymi kieruje się Unia Europejska w ramach liberalnego paradygmatu rozwiązywania konfliktu w Górskim Karabachu.(abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Rivalry; Armed conflicts; National interest; Diplomacy

PL

Rywalizacja; Konflikty zbrojne; Interes narodowy; Dyplomacja

• Czasopismo: Przegląd Europejski
• Rocznik: 2022
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 145--160

Twórcy

autor

Harutyun Voskanyan

• University of Warsaw (Warsaw, Poland)

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.31338/1641-2478pe.1.22.10