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2022 | Vol. 10, Iss. 1 | 21--34
Tytuł artykułu

Ratification of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Towards A New Structure of Political Conflict?

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
Has the high-profile public opposition to recent EU trade agreements supplanted the traditional socio-economic pattern of competition in European trade policy with a value-driven one? This article draws on new data analysing the outcome of the ratifi cation process of a mixed free trade agreement (CETA) in the European Parliament and in all national parliaments that have so far completed ratification. With help of a logistic regression model analysing the vote-outcome, this article demonstrates that despite high social salience, economic considerations remain prominent. Values (TAN-GAL cleavage) were relevant but played a diff erent role than expected. Against the expectation, green parties associated with the GAL-spectrum voted against CETA demonstrating that party preferences on specific values do not necessarily coincide or generate the same policy preference. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Strony
21--34
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • University of Wrocław, Poland
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171657190

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