Sense of Fairness or Hunger for Revenge? : it Does Make a Difference

• Autorzy: Mihály Ormos , Dusán Timotity
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We analyze the driving factors of anomalistic patterns found in experimental studies related to bargaining games. In particular, we investigate whether the well-documented deviation from self-interested behavior can be partly, or entirely, attributed to revenge rather than fairness. Although, in general, related literature does not distinguish between the two latter notions, we highlight their differences and show that revenge significantly, and independently from the sense of fairness, contributes to decision-making in ultimatum games. Moreover, we show that, when controlling for various attributes, the hunger for revenge becomes the sole driving factor for both positively and negatively reciprocal behavior, rendering the sense of fairness insignificant. Our further cross-sectional analysis yields that gender differences are also very significant; however, the measured effects of fairness and revenge remain unaffected by this latter finding. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Justice; Gender; Gender gap; Psychology; Ultimatum game

PL

Sprawiedliwość; Płeć; Różnica między płciami; Psychologia; Gra Ultimatum

• Czasopismo: Economics & Sociology
• Rocznik: 2023
• Tom: 16
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 200--213

Twórcy

autor

Mihály Ormos

• Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary; John von Neumann University Kecskemét, Hungary

autor

Dusán Timotity

• WorldQuant LLC, Budapest, Hungary

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.14254/2071-789X.2023/16-1/13