Koordynacja działań zbiorowych i metody sprawiedliwego podziału w sektorze publicznym

• Autorzy: Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska

Warianty tytułu

Collective Action Problem and Fair-Division Methods in Public Sector

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu było zaprezentowanie teoretycznych podstaw problemu koordynacji działań zbiorowych oraz zaproponowanie metod sprawiedliwego podziału, które mogą być zastosowane do konstruowania budżetów polityki rolnej. W publikacji przedyskutowano wyniki badań eksperymentalnych nad skłonnością jednostek do kooperacji i podziałów sprawiedliwych, a następnie zaprezentowano możliwości zastosowania algorytmów sprawiedliwego podziału, które mają prowadzić do akceptowanych podziałów w praktyce wyboru publicznego. Wyniki badań wskazują, że osiągnięcie poczucia sprawiedliwości wymaga transparentności podziałów na podstawie jednoznacznie określonego wyboru kryteriów i metod.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The objective of the paper was to present theoretical concept of collective action problem and to propose fair-division methods, which might be used in agricultural policy budgeting. The experimental economics results on the propensity of individuals to cooperation and fair divisions, and the possibilities of using fair-division algorithms, which are to lead to acceptable divisions in the practice of public choice, were presented. The results of the research indicate that achieving a sense of fairness requires the transparency of divisions based on a clearly defined selection of criteria and methods.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Rolnictwo; Polityka rolna; Budżet państwa; Podział dochodu narodowego; Współpraca

EN

Agriculture; Agricultural policy; State budget; Division of national income; Cooperation

• Czasopismo: Wieś i Rolnictwo
• Rocznik: 2023
• Numer: nr 1 (198)
• Strony: 85--99

Twórcy

autor

Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska

• Uniwersytet Przyrodniczy w Poznaniu

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.53098/wir012023/04