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Abstrakty
Theoretical background: Theory of public finance theory quite widely recognized that the purest indicator of government size is to observe the determinants and trend of level of public spending. It could be easy translates into the statement that following demand of government for money, first satisfied by taxes, enables to conclude, in particular, that the ratio of tax revenues to gross domestic product is the most appropriate indicator of the fiscal efficiency of the tax system.
Purpose of the article: The very aim of paper is to determine, on the basis of constructed original taxation density rate, the diversification of the spatial economics of local revenues from taxation of land and developments. The supplementary goal comes from the identification of attributes of tax jurisdiction size shaping density of taxation. In particular, it is undertaken to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the rudimentary statistics of the correlation between the size of tax jurisdiction and intensity of land and development taxation measured by brand new index: tax density.
Research methods: The research methods, apart from the query and analysis of the literature on the subject, are descriptive statistics of the population of 2,477 communes in Poland in terms of taxation density and the strength of the correlation between taxation density and attributes of tax jurisdiction defined by its size in both fiscal perspective (total tax revenues, tax revenues per capita) and demographic indexes (population, population density). The area of tax jurisdiction is correspondingly discussed. There is also employed OLS method for study correlation between tax density and indexes of tax jurisdiction size. The data are for the fiscal year of 2021.
Main findings: Taxation density is, on average, the highest in urban communes, which results from a significant share of land and improvements subject to property tax. In urban communes, the share of real estate tax is on average 98.91% of total revenues from taxation of land and improvements. While in rural communes, where the lowest average level density of taxation has been recorded, the share in question is on average 73.73%. Examination of taxation density statistics for each of three subpopulations of communes (urban ones, urban-rural ones, and rural ones) indicates that in each case statistics of the distribution of tax density is attributed by positive skew and has sharper peak around the mean, but kurtosis is the highest for rural communes. It has been observed that the shapes of the distribution of total tax revenues, tax revenues per capita and population density are most similar to the shape of the distribution of taxation density in rural communes. The crucial conclusion is that the most significance for tax density growth is the increase of population in accordance with population density. The greater tax jurisdiction measured by population the greater intensity of fiscal exploitation of land occurs. Empirics of tax density for Polish communes fails to observe diseconomies of scale according to population density. There is a very parallel structure of elasticity of tax density for different features of tax jurisdiction, excluding for urban tax jurisdiction two attributes: tax revenues per capita (no statistical significant evidence of elasticity) and area (in contrast to another types of communes elasticity is positive).(original abstract)
Purpose of the article: The very aim of paper is to determine, on the basis of constructed original taxation density rate, the diversification of the spatial economics of local revenues from taxation of land and developments. The supplementary goal comes from the identification of attributes of tax jurisdiction size shaping density of taxation. In particular, it is undertaken to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the rudimentary statistics of the correlation between the size of tax jurisdiction and intensity of land and development taxation measured by brand new index: tax density.
Research methods: The research methods, apart from the query and analysis of the literature on the subject, are descriptive statistics of the population of 2,477 communes in Poland in terms of taxation density and the strength of the correlation between taxation density and attributes of tax jurisdiction defined by its size in both fiscal perspective (total tax revenues, tax revenues per capita) and demographic indexes (population, population density). The area of tax jurisdiction is correspondingly discussed. There is also employed OLS method for study correlation between tax density and indexes of tax jurisdiction size. The data are for the fiscal year of 2021.
Main findings: Taxation density is, on average, the highest in urban communes, which results from a significant share of land and improvements subject to property tax. In urban communes, the share of real estate tax is on average 98.91% of total revenues from taxation of land and improvements. While in rural communes, where the lowest average level density of taxation has been recorded, the share in question is on average 73.73%. Examination of taxation density statistics for each of three subpopulations of communes (urban ones, urban-rural ones, and rural ones) indicates that in each case statistics of the distribution of tax density is attributed by positive skew and has sharper peak around the mean, but kurtosis is the highest for rural communes. It has been observed that the shapes of the distribution of total tax revenues, tax revenues per capita and population density are most similar to the shape of the distribution of taxation density in rural communes. The crucial conclusion is that the most significance for tax density growth is the increase of population in accordance with population density. The greater tax jurisdiction measured by population the greater intensity of fiscal exploitation of land occurs. Empirics of tax density for Polish communes fails to observe diseconomies of scale according to population density. There is a very parallel structure of elasticity of tax density for different features of tax jurisdiction, excluding for urban tax jurisdiction two attributes: tax revenues per capita (no statistical significant evidence of elasticity) and area (in contrast to another types of communes elasticity is positive).(original abstract)
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
201--215
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- University of Economics in Katowice, Poland
Bibliografia
- Agrawal, D.R. (2015). The Tax Gradient: Spatial Aspects of Fiscal Competition. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(2), 1-29. doi:10.1257/pol.20120360
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- Anderson, J.E. (1986). Property Taxes and the Timing of Urban Land Development. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16(4), 483-492. doi:10.1016/0166-0462(86)90019-0
- Anderson, J.E. (1999). Two-Rate Property Tax Effects on Land Development. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 18(2), 181-190. doi:10.1023/A:1007766608770
- BDL. (2023). Baza Danych Lokalnych [The Base of Local Data]. Retrieved from https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/start
- Beale, J.H. (1919). Jurisdiction to Tax. Harvard Law Review, 32(6), 587-633. doi:10.2307/1327994
- Beck, M. (1965). Determinants of the Property Tax Level. Case Study of Northeastern New Jersey. National Tax Journal, 18(1), 74-77. doi:10.1086/ntj41791424
- Beckmann, M., & Puu, T. (1985). Spatial Economics: Density, Potential, and Flow. Amsterdam - New York: North-Holland.
- Bennett, R.J. (1980). The Geography of Public Finance: Welfare under Fiscal Federalism and Local Government Finance. London - New York: Methuen.
- Blase, M.G., & Staub, W.J. (1971). Real Property Taxes in the Rural-Urban Fringe. Land Economics, 47(2), 168-174. doi:10.2307/3145458
- Blöchliger, H., & Pinero-Campos, J. (2011). Tax Competition between Sub-central Governments. OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government Working Paper Series, 13, 1-45.
- Breuckner, J.K. (1986). A Modern Analysis of the Effects of Site Value Taxation. National Tax Journal, 39(1), 49-58. doi:10.1086/NTJ41792157
- Capozza, D., & Li, Y. (1994). The Intensity and Timing of Investment: The Case of Land. American Economic Review, 84(4), 889-904.
- Cho, S.-H., Kim, S.G., Lambert, D.M., & Roberts, R.K. (2013). Impact of a Two-Rate Property Tax on Residential Densities. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(3), 685-704. doi:10.1093/ajae/aas141
- Duranton, G., & Puga, D. (2020). The Economics of Urban Density. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34(3), 3-26. doi:10.1257/jep.34.3.3
- England, R.W., & Ravichandran, M. (2010). Property Taxation and Density of Land Development: A Simple Model with Numerical Simulations. Eastern Economic Journal, 36(2), 229-238. doi:10.1057/eej.2009.7
- Feld, L.P., Kirchgässner, G., & Schaltegger, C.A. (2010). Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments. Southern Economic Journal, 77(1), 27-48. doi:10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27
- Felis, P. (2015). Agricultural Tax Fiscal Efficiency in Poland. Management Theory and Studies for Rural Business and Infrastructure Development, 37(1), 38-47. doi:10.15544/mts.2015.04
- Gabler, L.R. (1969). Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Urban Public Sector. Land Economics, 45(4), 425-434. doi:10.2307/3145441
- Henderson, J.V. (1974). The Sizes and Types of Cities. American Economic Review, 64(4), 640-656.
- Keesing, D.B., & Sherk, D.R. (1971). Population Density in Patternd of Trade and Development. American Economic Review, 61(5), 956-961.
- Kim, J., & Doughert, S. (eds.). (2020). Ageing and Fiscal Challenges across Levels of Government. OECD Fiscal Federalism Studies. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/2bbfbda8-en
- Liberati, P., & Sacchi, A. (2013). Tax Decentralization and Local Government Size. Public Choice, 157(1-2), 183-205. doi:10.1007/s11127-012-9937-9
- Mills, E.S. (1970). Urban Density Functions. Urban Studies, 7(1), 5-20.
- Nairn, A.G., & O'Neill, G.J. (1988). Population Density Functions: A Differential Equation Approach. Journal of Regional Science, 28(1), 89-102.
- Peng, S.-K., & Ping, W. (2009). A Normative Analysis of Housing-Related Tax Policy in a General Equilibrium Model of Housing Quality and Prices. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(5), 667-696. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01425.x
- Puu, T. (1989). On Growth and Dispersal of Populations. Annals of Regional Science, 23(3), 171-186. doi:10.1007/BF01581933
- Sheshinski, E. (1973). Congestion and the Optimum City Size. American Economic Review, 63(2), 61-66.
- Solow, R.M. (1972). Congestion, Density and the Use of Land in Transportation. Swedish Journal of Economics, 74(1), 161-173.
- Turnbull, G. (1988). Property Taxes and the Transition of land to Urban Use. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 1(4), 393-403. doi:10.1007/BF00187074
- Walasik, A., & Gałuszka, J. (2017). The Economics of Fiscal Competition. A Confluence of Corporate Finance and Subcentral Government Finance. Katowice: University of Economics in Katowice Publishing House.
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Bibliografia
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