The Battle for Differentiated Integration in the EU Energy Policy

• Autorzy: Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse

Warianty tytułu

Zróżnicowana integracja w polityce energetycznej UE

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The main purpose of the article is to describe differentiated integration in the EU energy policy which concerns the exemption of the Nord Stream 2 and OPAL pipelines from European law, and more precisely from the so-called Third Energy Package. The attempt to derogate EU law in relation to these pipelines in Germany was of great economic and political importance for Central Europe as a whole. It also affected the modification of EU law and thus had systemic consequences for the entire EU. In this article, I will analyse the process aimed at derogation from the application of European law and its consequences. Furthermore, I will try to answer the question to what extent the public discussion hindered the possibilities of exemption from European law. Finally, I will turn to clarifying the reasons why exclusion from EU law in the case under review has failed. This seems to be of great importance when explaining other failed attempts to diversify integration in recent years as well; it may also help delineate what limitations there are for the very process in the future. (original abstract)

Głównym celem artykułu jest opisanie zróżnicowanej integracji w polityce energetycznej UE, która dotyczy wyłączenia gazociągów Nord Stream 2 i OPAL spod prawa europejskiego, a dokładniej z tzw. Trzeciego Pakietu Energetycznego. Próba derogacji prawa UE w odniesieniu do tych gazociągów miała ogromne znaczenie gospodarcze i polityczne dla całej Europy Środkowej. Wpłynęło to również na modyfikację prawa unijnego, a tym samym miało konsekwencje systemowe dla całej UE. W niniejszym artykule przeanalizuję proces mający na celu odstępstwo od stosowania prawa europejskiego oraz jego konsekwencje. Ponadto postaram się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, w jakim stopniu dyskusja publiczna utrudniła możliwość wyłączenia spod prawa europejskiego gazociągów. Na koniec przejdę do wyjaśnienia powodów, dla których wyłączenie spod prawa Unii w rozpatrywanej sprawie nie powiodło się. Wydaje się to mieć duże znaczenie dla wyjaśnienia innych nieudanych prób dywersyfikacji integracji w ostatnich latach; może również pomóc w nakreśleniu, jakie ograniczenia istnieją dla samego procesu w przyszłości. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Energy policy; Gas manufacture

PL

Polityka energetyczna; Gazownictwo

• Czasopismo: Eastern Review
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: 11
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 27--50

Twórcy

autor

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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Identyfikatory

DOI

https://doi.org/10.18778/1427-9657.11.15