The Work-on-Demand Platform as a Part of Monopoly Capital : The Example of a Global Ride-Hailing Company

• Autorzy: Bartosz Mika , Damian Winczewski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The purpose of this article is to consider Uber's economic model in connection with Sweezy and Baran's theory of monopoly capital. The article's main thesis is that monopoly capital theory still provides useful analytical tools for understanding enterprises operating under platform capitalism. It has been shown that companies such as Uber attract patient venture capital through their monopoly position, which is also strengthened through marketing, and that their marketing serves as an element of outside lobbying. At the same time, Uber offers innovative methods of investing and accumulating an economic surplus, which changes the source of monopoly power. Despite several important differences in the operating model of platform companies compared to the monopolies of the Fordist era, they still rely on the familiar model of exploitation of both consumers and workers. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Political economy; Financial capital; Passenger traffic

PL

Ekonomia polityczna; Kapitał finansowy; Przewozy pasażerskie

• Czasopismo: Polish Sociological Review
• Rocznik: 2024
• Numer: nr 1 (225)
• Strony: 31--48

Twórcy

autor

Bartosz Mika

• University of Gdańsk

autor

Damian Winczewski

• Maria Curie-Sklodowska University

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.26412/psr225.02