How Law's Nature Influences Law's Logic

• Autorzy: Jaap Hage
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper, I analyze the shift in Twardowski's views between his early psychologistic theory of logic and his later anti-psychologistic theory. In particular, I point out that the interpretation suggesting that this change merely involves Twardowski enriching his ontology with products encounters a certain problem in light of his earlier views. To present this problem more precisely, I discuss the foundations of Twardowski's theory of products, focusing on aspects relevant to the issue of psychologism. Based on this, I reconstruct Twardowski's theory of logic and highlight where he identified the fallacy of psychologism. I contrast this reconstructed theory with Twardowski's earlier views at key points and demonstrate that the difference between his early psychologistic theory and his later anti-psychologistic theory is a matter of a shift in emphasis rather than a significant change in the theoretical system itself, and that Twardowski himself understood (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Logic

PL

Logika

• Czasopismo: Studia Humana
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: 13(3)
• Strony: 4--17

Twórcy

autor

Jaap Hage

• Maastricht University (emeritus)

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.2478/sh-2024-0015