The Economic Role of Technology in International Trade: Theory and Practice in the Trade War

• Autorzy: Wanda Dugiel
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

EN

Scientific purpose. The aim of the article is to analyze the impact of technological changes and restrictions on the freedom of technology transfer in the contemporary world economy on international trade in the context of the trade conflict between the United States and China.
Research process and methods. Interrelationships between the role of technological changes and trade, the issue of monopoly rent resulting from the technological advantage of some countries, were examined on the basis of the theory of international trade (Ricardian model, Heckscher-Ohlin) and subsequent theories, in particular the approach of Posner, Krugman, Melitz. To analyze the problem of technology transfer limitations in the modern world economy, mainly due to China's trade practices, a quantitative and qualitative method was used as well as a review of statistics of international trade in high-tech goods. Foreign direct investment in China was conditioned by the transfer of knowledge and advanced technologies from the United States.
THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: On the basis of the theoretical approach to the premises of trade exchange (Ricardian model, Heckscher-Ohlin theory) and subsequent theories, in particular the approach of Schumpeter, Krugman and Melitz, the relationship between the role of technological changes and the gains from international trade was examined. The article presents the motives behind the escalation of the technological trade war between the United States and China.
RESEARCH RESULTS: Scientific analysis confirmed that technological changes and the spread of technology as a result of the intensification of international trade turnover are associated with a specific impact on benefits and losses for the country with a technological advantage as a result of the "learning by doing" phenomenon. Theoretical analysis has led to conclusions that justify the use of massive public investments in US industrial policy.
CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Further research should cover issues regarding the influence of states on supporting the development of advanced technologies. Appropriately shaped economic policy consisting in increased spending on research and development and the use of trade and industrial policy tools will significantly contribute to the increase in the competitiveness of the United States economy. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Handel międzynarodowy; Polityka technologiczna; Postęp technologiczny; Monopolizacja handlu zagranicznego; Zmiany technologiczne

EN

International trade; Technology policy; Technological progress; Monopolization of foreign trade; Technological change

• Czasopismo: Horyzonty Polityki
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: 15
• Numer: nr 51 Mediation and Mediatisation of the Contemporary Warfare
• Strony: 203--223

Twórcy

autor

Wanda Dugiel

• SGH - Warsaw School of Economics

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

https://doi.org/10.35765/hp.2626