Tax Revenue Decentralisation and Corruption in the Context of Civil Liberties: A Cross-Country Study.

• Autorzy: Pawel Galinski
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In studies on the functioning of the public sector there are surveys examining the deter-minants of corruption, including the level of fiscal decentralisation in the light of economic and social development. However, there is a dearth of survey data presenting the impact of the revenue side of this decentralisation in the context of civil liberties. Thus, the aim of the paper is to examine the influence of tax revenue decentralisation and civil liberties on corruption based on the OECD countries, taking intoaccount the impacts of a country's size, scope of the public sector and public procurements, macroeconomic un-certainty, and interactions between tax revenue decentralisation and civil liberties on the phenomenon under study. The empirical study concerns 38 OECD countries in the period 2012-2022. Therefore, longitudinal data models were estimated, namely the fixed effects model and panel quantile regression with fixed effects using the method of moments.The survey showed that an increase in tax revenue decentralisation causes a decrease in corruption. In addition, civil liberties and their interaction with aforementioned decentralisation may determine corruption; however, this is heterogeneous throughout the distribution of corruption level. In addition, the scope of the public sector and mac-roeconomic uncertainty stimulate rent-seeking behaviour, which weakens the institu-tional foundations to counteract corruption. Thus, policymakers should be aware that the growing scope of the public sector, government fragmentation, and the functioning of bottlenecks in the performance of official duties at sub-national level might lead to a de-crease in the efficiency of anti-corruption policy or programmes. Based on the findings, it is crucial to ensure price stability to reduce the analysed dysfunction.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corruption; Public procurement; Civil liberties; Decentralization

PL

Korupcja; Zamówienia publiczne; Wolności obywatelskie; Decentralizacja

• Czasopismo: Forum Scientiae Oeconomia
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: 12
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 84--98

Twórcy

autor

Pawel Galinski

• Faculty of Management, Department of Banking and Finance, University of Gdansk,Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.23762/FSO_VOL12_NO2_5