Charakterystyka zbioru równowag w submodularnych grach z indywidualną podażą dóbr publicznych

• Autorzy: Łukasz Woźny
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W pracy rozpatrujemy statyczną i dynamiczną gospodarkę z indywidualną podażą wydatków na dobro publiczne. Celami pracy są: podanie warunków wystarczających do istnienia równowagi Nasha gry opisującej takie gospodarki oraz charakterystyka struktury zbioru tych równowag dla ogólnych funkcji produkcji dobra publicznego. Metody użyte w pracy opierają się na wynikach optymalizacji funkcji super- i submodularnych (Topkis 1995) i są uogólnieniem szerszej klasy agregatów metod użytych w pracach: Amir, Lambson (2000) oraz Sundaram (1989a). (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Dobra publiczne; Podaż; Gry ekonomiczne

EN

Public goods; Supply; Economic games

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2009
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 51--70

Twórcy

autor

Łukasz Woźny

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