What Factors Matter for the Evaluation of Relationship between the Perceptions of Corruption and Politicization in Local Administration in Poland

• Autorzy: Maria Piotrowska

Warianty tytułu

Jakie czynniki mają znaczenie dla oceny związku między korupcją a naciskami politycznymi w administracji lokalnej w Polsce

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The main purpose of the paper is to identify factors that can matter for the relationship between perceptions of corruption and politicization by the public service officials at the local administration level in Poland. Four groups of factors are considered: 1) the structure of administration, 2) citizen voice as an "external" (to public sector) factor, 3) agency characteristics, and 4) individual characteristics. The research is based on a questionnaire survey of 858 public officials working in 100 commune councils in Poland in 2009. The findings based on the correlation analysis show that the location of a commune council and a type of a commune councils strongly influence the relationship between politicization and corruption. (original abstract)

Głównym celem artykułu jest ustalenie czynników, które mogą mieć znaczenie dla postrzegania przez urzędników urzędów gminnych w Polsce związku między korupcją a naciskami politycznymi. Rozważane są cztery grupy czynników: 1) struktura administracji, 2) opinie obywateli, jako czynnik zewnętrzny w odniesieniu do sektora publicznego, 3) charakterystyki urzędu, 4) indywidualne cechy urzędników. Badanie jest oparte na wynikach badania ankietowego przeprowadzonego wśród 858 urzędników pracujących w 100 urzędach gminnych w Polsce w 2009 roku. Wyniki oparte na analizie korelacyjnej sugerują, że lokalizacja geograficzna oraz typ gminy mają istotne znaczenie dla postrzegania związku między korupcją a naciskami politycznymi. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Local administration; Pressure groups; Corruption

PL

Administracja lokalna; Grupy nacisku; Korupcja

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu. Ekonomia
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: 9
• Numer: nr 136 Macroeconomics
• Strony: 138--149

Twórcy

autor

Maria Piotrowska

• Wrocław University of Economics, Poland

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