Procedural Fairness, a Sense of Alienation and Paying Taxes

• Autorzy: Małgorzata Niesiobędzka , Sabina Kołodziej

Warianty tytułu

Sprawiedliwość proceduralna, poczucie alienacji i płacenie podatków

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper presents the results of two studies analysing the impact of procedural fairness and a sense of alienation on real tax payments in the public goods game. Study 1 showed that an unfair procedure of determining the rules of the game increases the frequency of tax evasion. In Study 2, tax evasion was associated with a sense of alienation induced in the subjects, understood as a conviction about the ineffectiveness of one's own actions. The results of the studies presented in this paper indicate the importance of the treatment of taxpayers by the tax system as a factor influencing the propensity for tax fraud. (original abstract)

Artykuł przedstawia wyniki dwóch badań analizujących wpływ sprawiedliwości proceduralnej oraz poczucia alienacji na rzeczywiste wpłaty podatkowe w grze o dobro wspólne. W badaniu 1 stwierdzono, że niesprawiedliwy sposób ustalania reguł gry zwiększa częstość uchylania się od płacenia podatków. W badaniu 2 uchylanie się od podatków wiązało się z wywołanym u badanych poczuciem alienacji rozumianym jako przekonanie o nieskuteczności własnych działań. Wyniki badań przedstawionych w artykule wskazują wagę sposobu traktowania podatników przez system podatkowy jako czynnika kształtującego skłonność do popełniania oszustw podatkowych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Taxes; Justice; Alienation; Common good

PL

Podatki; Sprawiedliwość; Alienacja; Dobro wspólne

• Czasopismo: Decyzje
• Rocznik: 2019
• Numer: nr 31
• Strony: 57--71

Twórcy

autor

Małgorzata Niesiobędzka

• University of Białystok

autor

Sabina Kołodziej

• Kozminski University

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.121