Franchising as a Way of Reducing Moral Hazard in the Tourism Market

• Autorzy: Daniel Puciato , Agnieszka Łoś , Kazimierz Mrozowicz
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The objective of this study was to determine the role of franchising in reducing information asymmetry, and moral hazard arising under this asymmetry between tourism service providers cooperating together. It was indicated that the nature of the tourism market assesses the implementation of franchising as a good solution in this case, and it is expected that the popularity of using franchising as a business model in the tourism sector will increase. Based on the classical static bilateral principal-agent model, the advantages of using contracts that differentiate the remuneration of an agent according to the effort in order to limit the risk of business failure were presented. In the study, the practical implications for drafting franchise contracts in the tourism sector that arise from the implemented model were also proposed.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Franchising; Information asymmetry; Moral hazard; Tourism market

PL

Franchising; Asymetria informacji; Pokusa nadużycia; Rynek turystyczny

• Czasopismo: Argumenta Oeconomica
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: nr 1 (30)
• Strony: 127--147

Twórcy

autor

Daniel Puciato

• Opole University of Technology, Poland

autor

Agnieszka Łoś

• Opole University of Technology, Poland

autor

Kazimierz Mrozowicz

• The Jerzy Kukuczka Academy of Physical Education in Katowice, Poland

Bibliografia

• Akerlof, G., The Market for Lemons. Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", 84(3), pp. 488-500, 1970.
• Bednarska, M., Franchising jako sposób redukcji ryzyka popytowego w hotelarstwie [Franchising as a Way of Reducing Demand Risk in the Hotel Industry], "Problemy Turystyki", 27(1-2), pp. 53-65, 2004.
• Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M., Contract Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge and London, pp. 30-35, 2005.
• Bugan-Kurluta, K., Umowa franchisingu [The Franchise Contract]. Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, Warszawa 2001.
• Caves, R., Murphy, W., Franchising. Firms, Markets and Intangible Assets, "Southern Economic", 43, pp. 572-586, 1976.
• Cunill, O., Forteza, C., The Franchise Contract in Hotel Chains: A Study of Hotel Chain Growth and Market Concentrations, "Tourism Economics", 16(3), pp. 493-515, 2010.
• Eisenhardt, K., Agency Theory. An Assessment and Review, "Academy of Management Review", 14, pp. 57-74, 1989.
• Gayle, B., Miller, R., Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation, "American Economic Review", 99(5), pp. 1740-1769, 2009.
• Holmström, B., Moral Hazard and Observability, "Bell Journal of Economics", 10, pp. 74-91, 1979.
• Kacprzak, M., Mikulska, T., Franchising w turystyce na przykładzie biura podróży TUI [Franchising in the Tourism Sector on the Example of TUI Tourist Agency], "Oeconomica", 7(2), pp. 23-35, 2008.
• Klein, B., Murphy, K., Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, "The Journal of Law and Economics", 8, pp. 265-297, 1988.
• Kundu, S., Contractor, F., Country Location Choices of Service Multinationals. An Empirical Study of the International Hotel Sector, "Journal of International Management", 5(4), pp. 299-317, 1999.
• Lafontaine, F., Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results,"Rand Journal of Economics", 23, pp. 263-283, 1992.
• Lal, R., Improving Channel Coordination through Franchising, "Marketing Science", 9, pp. 299-318, 1990.
• Łącka, I., Franchising jako jedna z form aliansów strategicznych [Franchising as One of the Strategic Alliances Forms] "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Roczniki Prawnicze", 16, pp. 51-68, 2004.
• Łoś, A., Puciato, D., Niedoskonały rynek świadczeń zdrowotnych [An Imperfect Market of Healthcare Suppliers] "Handel Wewnętrzny", 1, pp. 17-24, 2011.
• Macho-Stadler, I., Perez-Castrillo, J., An Introduction to the Economics of Information, Incentives and Contracts. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 35-62, 2001.
• Martin, R., Franchising and Risk Management, "The American Economic Review", 78, pp. 954-968, 1988.
• Martorell, O., Mulet, C., Otero, L., Choice of Market Entry Mode by Balearic Hotel Chains in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, "International Journal of Hospitality Management", 31(6), pp. 38-49, 2012.
• Mirrlees, J., An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, "Review of Economic Studies", 38, pp. 175-208, 1971.
• Ostaszewski, J., Cicirko, T., Finanse spółki akcyjnej [Finances of Public Limited Company]. Difin, Warszawa, 2006.
• Oxenfeldt, A., Kelly, A., Will Successful Franchise Systems Ultimately Become Wholly- owned Chains?, "Journal of Retailing", 44, pp. 3-13, 1969.
• Przeworski, A., States and Market. A Primer in Political Eeconomy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.
• Raport o franczyzie w Polsce 2009 [Franchising in Poland 2009]. Profit System, Warszawa, 2010.
• Rayo, L., Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams, "Review of Economic Studies", 74(3), pp. 937-963, 2007.
• Riley, J., Silver Signals. Twenty-five Years of Screening and Signaling, "Journal of Economic Literature", 39(2), pp.432-478, 2001.
• Rochet, J., Stole, L., The Economics of Multidimensional Screening, [in:] M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, S. Turnovsky, Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 150-197, 2003.
• Rodriguez, A., Determining Factors in Entry Choice for International Expansion. The Case of the Spanish Hotel Industry, "Tourism Management", 23(6), pp. 597-607, 2002.
• Rubin, H.,The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, "Journal of Law and Economics", 21, pp. 223-234, 1978.
• Sala, J., Formy współczesnego hotelarstwa [Form of the Contemporary Hotel Industry]. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego, Kraków, 2008.
• Szostak, D., Łańcuchy, systemy i sieci hotelowe jako element współczesnego zagospodarowania turystycznego [Hotel Chains, Systems and Networks as an Element of Current Tourism Level], "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Ekonomiczne Problemy Turystyki", 466 (9), pp. 251-256, 2007.
• Sannikov, Y., A Continuous-time Version of the Principal-agent Problem, "Review of Economic Studies", 73(3), 957-984, 2008.
• Shapiro, C., Stiglitz, J., Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, "American Economic Review", 74(3), pp. 433-444, 1984.
• Stecki, L., Franchising, TNOiK, Toruń, 1997.
• Stigler, G., The Economics of Information, "Journal of Political Economy",69(3), pp. 213- 225, 1969.
• Szczepański, J., Szyszko, L., Finanse przedsiębiorstwa [Finances of an Enterprise]. PWE, Warszawa, 2007.
• Wainwright, K., Dual Organizational Structure of Franchise Contracts. Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, pp. 8-11, 2007.
• Weiermair, K., On the Concept and Definition of Quality in Tourism, [in:] P. Keller, T. Bieger, Quality Management in Tourism. Université de St. Gallen, Gallen, 1997.