Dylematy polityki budżetowej państwa wobec rolnictwa

• Autorzy: Aldona Zawojska

Warianty tytułu

Dilemmas of Fiscal Policy of the State towards Agriculture

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Autorka przedstawiła związki zachodzące pomiędzy polityką budżetową państwa (fiskalną) a rolnictwem. Analiza oparta została na teorii wyboru publicznego, którą wykorzystano m.in. do wyjaśnienia powodów centralizacji polityki rolnej w UE. Autorka wskazała również na główne problemy ingerencji państwa w procesy gospodarcze poprzez budżet, skupiając się na zjawisku korupcji.

EN

The paper uses public choice theory to explain how fiscal policy affected by the intensives of politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups interacts agriculture. Public choice theory makes clear that rising trends in government spending are caused by special interests of groups of people who benefit a lot per head from a particular item of government spending, whereas the general population (consumers and taxpayers) are not hurt much per head. Firstly, the paper presents the interactions between fiscal policy and agriculture. Then, it overviews the public choice rationale for and recognizes the difficulties in agricultural policy reforming to the dominance of farmers in the input process. Finally, empirically proved relationship between public budget and corruption were presented. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Budżet państwa; Rolnictwo; Ekonomia wyboru; Korupcja; Analiza piśmiennictwa ekonomicznego; Materiały konferencyjne; Teoria wyboru publicznego; Wydatki państwa

EN

State budget; Agriculture; Economics of choice; Corruption; Economic literature analysis; Conference materials; Public choice theory; Government spending

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu
• Rocznik: 2003
• Numer: nr 980 Wyzwania stojące przed rolnictwem i wsią u progu XXI wieku
• Strony: 625--632

Twórcy

autor

Aldona Zawojska

Bibliografia

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