Wynagrodzenie menedżerskie jako mechanizm nadzoru korporacyjnego

• Autorzy: Maria Aluchna

Warianty tytułu

Management's Remuneration as a Mechanism of Corporative Supervision

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Artykuł dotyczy wykorzystywania poziomu i struktury wynagrodzenia w procesie motywowania kadry zarządzającej. Punkt wyjścia rozważań stanowi teoria agencji. Teoria ta wciąż pozostaje najczęściej wykorzystywaną perspektywą teoretyczną w badaniach nad motywacyjną funkcją wynagrodzeń. Rośnie świadomość niedoskonałości stosowania jednego podejścia i w efekcie obserwuje się integrację istniejących teorii oraz uwzględnianie w analizie czynników socjo-politycznych, instytucjonalnych, demograficznych, ekonomicznych oraz zasobów ludzkich.

EN

The article is devoted to use of level and structure of remuneration in process of manager's motivation. Starting point is agency theory. This theory the most frequently using theoretical perspective in research. (M.P.)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Menedżer; Kontrakty kierownicze; Ład korporacyjny; Kształtowanie wynagrodzeń; Motywacyjna funkcja płac; Teoria agencji

EN

Manager; Managerial contract; Corporate governance; Shaping remuneration; Wage incentives functions; Agency theory

• Czasopismo: Studia i Prace Kolegium Zarządzania i Finansów / Szkoła Główna Handlowa
• Rocznik: 2003
• Numer: z. 38
• Strony: 156--175

Twórcy

autor

Maria Aluchna

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