Trzeci Filar Nowej Umowy Kapitałowej - prezentacja i ocena

• Autorzy: Krzysztof Jackowicz
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Zaprezentowano konstrukcję trzeciego filaru Nowej Umowy Kapitłowej. Podjęto próbę jego wielokryteryjnej oceny. Porównano logiki regulacyjną i rynkową w dążeniu do wzmocnienia dyscypliny rynkowej i zbliżenia zakresu i szczegółowości ujawnianej przez banki informacji do poziomu społecznie optymalnego.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Adekwatność kapitałowa; Dyscyplina rynkowa; Nowa Umowa Kapitałowa

EN

Capital adequacy; Market discipline; New capital accord

• Czasopismo: Bezpieczny Bank
• Rocznik: 2005
• Numer: nr 3 (28)
• Strony: 109--123

Twórcy

autor

Krzysztof Jackowicz

Bibliografia

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• Proposal for Directives of the European Parliament and of the Council Re-casting Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 14 July 2004, s. 139-141 (Volume I) i s. 145-153 (Annexes techniques).
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