Reakcje polityki fiskalnej na wahania koniunkturalne - przyczyny zróżnicowania

• Autorzy: Michał Mackiewicz

Warianty tytułu

Reaction of Fiscal Policy to Business Cycles - the Reasons of Variation

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem opracowania jest wskazanie czynników, które powodują, że w wielu krajach polityka fiskalna prowadzona jest w sposób procykliczny. Przedstawiono najistotniejsze zagadnienia dotyczące pomiaru wpływu cyklu koniunkturalnego na kształtowanie się zmiennych fiskalnych. Wskazano czynniki, które są potencjalnymi determinantami zróżnicowania reakcji władz fiskalnych na wahania cykliczne. Zaprezentowano wyniki analizy empirycznej przeprowadzonej na podstawie danych panelowych dla krajów OECD.

EN

The main objective of this paper is to examine differences in the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy in the OECD countries empirically using a new method developed to compare directly the explanatory power of two groups of theories that try to explain why some countries run pro-cyclical fiscal policies. The analysis shows that stronger anticyclical fiscal policies are typically run by countries with better institutions, lower deficits, and a lower stock of public debt. However, the index of regulatory quality performs best in explaining the variance of output elasticity of budget surpluses, which contradicts the conventional view that financial constraints are the main reason behind fiscal procyclicality. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Wahania koniunkturalne; Polityka stabilizacyjna; Polityka fiskalna

EN

Business fluctuations; Stabilisation policy; Fiscal policy

• Czasopismo: Bank i Kredyt
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr 10
• Strony: 3--16

Twórcy

autor

Michał Mackiewicz

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