On Game Theory and Experimental Economics

• Autorzy: Ralf Boseman

Warianty tytułu

Teoria gier w ekonomice stosowanej

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

Przedstawiono zasadnicze koncepcje teorii gier w zastosowaniu do teorii makroekonomicznej. Na przykładzie wyjaśniono zależności zachodzące pomiędzy tą teorią a podjętym eksperymentem. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Game theory; Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic models

PL

Teoria gier; Makroekonomia; Modele makroekonomiczne

• Czasopismo: Przegląd Statystyczny
• Rocznik: 1998
• Tom: 45
• Numer: z. 4
• Strony: 487--503

Twórcy

autor

Ralf Boseman

• Bielefed University, Germany

Bibliografia

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