Dyscyplina rynkowa - czyli czy prywatny monitoring zwiększa bezpieczeństwo systemu bankowego

• Autorzy: Monika Marcinkowska

Warianty tytułu

Market Discypline - Does Private Monitoring Increase the Safety of Banking System?

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie zarysu problematyki dyscypliny rynkowej: jej mechanizmów, warunków efektywnego wykonywania prywatnego nadzoru oraz regulacji prawnych, które ułatwiają uczestnikom rynku wypełnianie tej funkcji. Stawiam tu hipotezę badawczą, stanowiącą, że funkcjonowanie prywatnego monitoringu banków - po spełnieniu fundamentalnych warunków - pozytywnie wpływa na zwiększenie bezpieczeństwa systemu bankowego.(fragment tekstu)

EN

The article outlines the issues of market discipline - that is the private monitoring and oversight over banks. Market discipline is considered to be an important component of the supervisory system, which can significantly influence the stability of individual institutions, as well as the whole banking system. The paper presents the theoretical considerations about private monitoring and the possibilities of its widespread application. The recommendations of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are discussed. The discussion of conditions for the limits and the conditions for effective market discipline is the complement for those considerations. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

System bankowy; Nadzór bankowy; Dyscyplina rynkowa

EN

Banking system; Bank supervision; Market discipline

• Czasopismo: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
• Rocznik: 2005
• Tom: 188 Banki a rozwój gospodarki
• Strony: 5--22

Twórcy

autor

Monika Marcinkowska

• Uniwersytet Łódzki

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