Rola wierzycieli prywatnych w rozwiązywaniu kryzysów finansowych

• Autorzy: Lidia Mesjasz

Warianty tytułu

The Role of Private Creditors in Overcoming Financial Crises

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest pogłębienie wiedzy na temat roli sektora prywatnego w rozwiązywaniu kryzysów finansowych lat 90. XX w. oraz sformułowanie zaleceń dotyczących usprawnienia procesu zarządzania kryzysami. W artykule omówiono rolę kapitału prywatnego w powstaniu kryzysów rachunku kapitałowego, scharakteryzowano przyczyny uzasadniające konieczność szerszego włączenia się wierzycieli prywatnych w rozwiązywanie kryzysów przedstawiono propozycje dotyczące usprawnienia procesu rozwiązywania kryzysów oraz ich wady i zalety oraz sformułowano najważniejsze wnioski wynikające z przeprowadzonej analizy oraz ich implikacje dla polityki gospodarczej. (fragment tekstu)

EN

Financial crises in economically developing countries in the 1990s revealed the key role that private creditors play when crises begin as well as when they are being fixed. The failure among creditors to coordinate their activities increased the level of foreign capital flowing out of these countries and worsened the damage the crises caused. A lack of cooperation between creditors and debtor countries made it difficult to agree on how debt should be restructured. To be effective, methods of overcoming future crises must guarantee wider participation of creditors in covering the costs of crises and enable - even require - cooperation between them. The international community has proposed three approaches to addressing the lack of coordination between creditors: statutory, contract and those based on rules of conduct. The markets have accepted the latter two and current practice suggests that both may succeed. If contracts and the rules of conduct agreed upon between economically developing countries and private creditors become the market standard then international solutions to financial crises will be faster, less chaotic and less costly than they have been. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Polityka gospodarcza; Kryzys finansowy; Sektor prywatny; Rynek kapitałowy; Wierzytelności

EN

Economic policy; Financial crisis; Private sector; Capital market; Liability

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 826
• Strony: 127--142

Twórcy

autor

Lidia Mesjasz

• Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie

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