Proximity in Coalition Building

• Autorzy: Julien Reynaud , Fabien Lange , Dariusz Gątarek , Christian Thimann
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together. Using this proximity index, we introduce a notion of relative linkages among coalition participants as determinant of coalition building. We propose an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, with linkages being represented by bilateral volumes of trade between voters. The results are able to explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and may be useful for other applications in international politics. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Voting decisions; International financial institutions; International politics

PL

Decyzje wyborcze; Międzynarodowe instytucje finansowe; Polityka międzynarodowa

• Czasopismo: Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics (CEJEME)
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: 3
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 111--132

Twórcy

autor

Julien Reynaud

• Paris School of Economics

autor

Fabien Lange

• Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV, France

autor

Dariusz Gątarek

• Tinbergen Institute, Netherlands

autor

Christian Thimann

• European Central Bank

Bibliografia

• Aleskerov, F., (2006), Power Indices Taking Into Account Agent's Preferences. [in:] Mathematical and Democracy, Recent Advances in Voting Systems and Collective Choice. Simeon and Pukelshein (Eds.), Springer.
• Alonso-Meijide, J.M., Bowles, C., (2005), Generating Functions for Coalitional Power Indices: An Application to the IMF. Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 137.
• Anderson, J., Marcouiller, D., (2002), Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84:2.
• Anderson, J., Van Wincoop, E., (2004), Trade Costs, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLII.
• Baldwin, R., Berglöf, E., Giavazzi, F., Widgren, M., (2000), EU Reforms for Tomorrow's Europe. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 2623.
• Banzhaf, J., (1965), Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 19.
• Barro, R., Lee, J.W., (2005), IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects? Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 52 (7).
• Bilbao, J.M., (2000), Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, Kluwer Publisher.
• Bindseil, U., Hantke, C., (1997), The Power Distribution in Decision Making among EU Member States. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 13.
• Bini Smaghi, L., (2006), IMF Governance and the Political Economy of a Consolidated European Seat, [in:] Reforming the IMF for the 21st century, E. Truman Ed., Institute for International Economics.
• Bird, G., Rowlands, D., (2001), IMF Lending: How is it Affected by Economic, Political, and Institutional Factors? Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 4(6).
• Calvo, E., Lasaga, J, (1997), Probabilistic Graphs and Power Indices: An Application to the Spanish Parliament, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 9.
• Calvo, E., Lasaga, J., Van Den Nouweland, A., (1999), Values of Games With Probabilistic Graphs. Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 37.
• Chen, N., (2002), Intra-national versus International Trade in the EU: Why Do National Borders Matter? CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 3402.
• Colomer, J.M., Martinez, F., (1995), The Paradox of Coalition Trading, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 7.
• Deegan, J., Packel, E.W., (1978), A New Index of Power for Simple n-Person Games, International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 7.
• Eaton, J., Kortum, S., (2002), Technology, Geography and Trade, Econometrica, Vol. 70:5.
• Edelman, P., (1997), A Note on Voting. Mathematical Social Science, Vol. 34.
• Estevadeordal, A, Frantz, B., Taylor, A., (2003), The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870-1939, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 68:2.
• Evans, C., (2001), The Cost of Outsourcing, Working Paper Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• Felsenthal, D., Machover., M., (1995), Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power: a critical re-appraisal. Theory and Decision, Vol. 38.
• Gatarek, L., Reynaud, J., Thimann, C., (2007), Proximity and linkages among coalition participants: a new voting power measure applied to the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank Working Paper Series, No. 819.
• Gupta, D., (2003), Coalitions in Theory and Practice: A Critical Review of Existing Research. Seminar on Modern European Politics, Cornell University, the 30 April 2003.
• Haarigan, J., (1993), OECD Imports and Trade Barriers in 1983, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 34:1.
• Hausken, K., Mohr, M., (2001), The Value of a player in n-person games, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 18.
• Head, K., Ries, J., (1998), Immigration and Trade Creation: Evidence from Canada, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 31:1.
• Head, K., Mayer, T., (2000), Non-Europe: The Magnitude and Causes of Market Fragmentation in the UE, Weltwirtschaftliches Archives, Vol. 136:2.
• Holler, M., Widgren, M., (1999), Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision- Making? Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol. 11.
• Hümmels, D., (2001), Toward a Geography of Trade Costs, Working Paper, Purdue University.
• Johnston R., (1978), On the Measurement of power: Some Reactions to Laver, Environment and Planning, Vol. 10.
• Kirman, A., Widgren, M., Faini, R., (1995), European Economic Decision-Making Policy: Progress or Paralysis? Economic Policy, vol. 10, No. 21.
• König, T., Bräuninger, T., (1997), The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules. Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol. 10.
• Krugman, P., (1991), Geography and trade, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
• Laruelle, A., Widgren, M., (1998), Is the allocation of voting power among EU states fair? Public Choice;, Vol. 94.
• Lane, J-E., Maeland, R., (1995), Voting Power under the EU Constitution. Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol. 7.
• Leech, D., (2001), Designing the voting system for the Council of the European Union. Public Choice, Vol. 112.
• Leech, D., (2002), Voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund. Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 109.
• Leech, D., Leech, R., (2005), Voting power in the Bretton Woods Institutions. Homo Oeconomicus, Vol. 22(4).
• Lees, C., Taylor, A., (2006), Explaining the 2005 Coalition Formation Process in Germany: A Comparison of Power Index and Median Legislator Approach, Politics, Vol. 26 (3).
• Lopez-Cordova, E., Meissner, J., (2003), Exchange Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era, American Economic Review, Vol. 93:1.
• Myerson, R., (1977), Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 2.
• Oatley, T., (2002), Commercial Banks and the International Monetary Fund: An Empirical Analysis, mimeo.
• Oatley, T., Yackee, J., (2004), American Interests and IMF Lending. International Politics, Vol. 41 (3).
• Owen, G., (1977), Values of Games with a priori Unions, [in:] R. Hein and O. Moeschlin (eds), Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Springer Ed.
• Owen, G., (1982), Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with a prior Unions, [in:] M. J. Holler (ed.), Power, Voting and Voting Power, Würzburg-Vienna, Physica Ed.
• Perlinger, T., (2000), Voting Power in an Ideological Spectrum. The Markov-Polya Index. Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 40.
• Portes, R., Rey, H., (2002), The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Transaction Flows, Working Paper, LSE.
• Rauch, J., Trindade, V., (2002), Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84:1.
• Rose, A., Van Wincoop, E., (2001), National Money as a Barrier to Trade: The Real Case fro Currency Union, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 91:2.
• Rose, A., (2004), The Effects of Common Currencies on International Trade: A Meta Analysis, [in:] Monetary Union and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade and Financial Development and Stability. Alexander, Melitz and Von Furstenberg Eds.
• Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., (1954), A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review, Vol. 48.
• Shenoy, P., (1982), The Banzhaf Power Index for Political Games. Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 2.
• Srivastava, R. K., Green, R. T., (1986), Determinants of Bilateral Trade-Flows, Journal of Business, Vol. 59.
• Stenlund, H., Lane, J-E., B. Bjurulf, (1985), Formal and Real Voting Power. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 1.
• Steunenberg, B., Schmidtchen, D., Koboldt, C., (1999), Strategic Power in the European Union. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 11 (3).
• Straffin P.D., (1977), Homogeneity, Independence and Power Indices, Public Choice, Vol. 30.
• Thacker, S., (1999), The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics, Vol. 52 (1).
• Truman, E., (2006), Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century. The Peterson Institute for International Economics Special Report 19, E. Truman Ed.
• Weber, R.J., (1988), Probabilistic values for games [in:] E. Roth, (ed.), The Shapley Value. Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press.

Identyfikatory

DOI

DOI: 10.24425/cejeme.2011.119308