Gry eksperymentalne i manowce racjonalistycznego egoizmu

• Autorzy: Szymon Czarnik

Warianty tytułu

Experimental Games, or Rationalistic Egoism Gone Astray

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Od ponad półwiecza nawarstwiają się wyniki eksperymentalne ukazujące nikłą wartość prognostyczną równowagi doskonałej, wyprowadzonej z zasady racjonalistycznego egoizmu. Artykuł stanowi krótki przegląd popularnych gier eksperymentalnych, w których uczestnicy podejmują decyzje o charakterze monetarnym, wpływające bezpośrednio na rozkład dochodów w grupie (w szczególności: w diadzie). Omówione są rezultaty badań nad przetargiem ultymatywnym, dyktatem i dylematem dyktatora, dylematem więźnia, grą zaufania, stonogą, wymianą darów i grą dobra publicznego. Szczególna rola przypada dylematowi dyktatora, badającemu gotowość do poprawy położenia partnera interakcji za cenę pogorszenia pozycji własnej. Jak się okazuje, ten elementarny dylemat osobisty stanowi tworzywo kilku bardziej złożonych i lepiej znanych gier dwu- i wieloosobowych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

For more than half a century experimental results accumulate that disprove prognostic value of perfect equilibrium, a concept derived from the principle of rationalistic egoism. The article is a short survey of popular experimental games in which actors make decisions of monetary consequences, thus shaping the income distribution in a group (dyad, in particular). A brief account is given of experimental research on ultimatum and dictator game, dictator's dilemma, trust game, centipede, gift exchange and public good game. Special focus is on dictator's dilemma which tests for readiness to benefit one's partner at one's own expense. This elementary personal dilemma turns out to constitute an essential part of more complicated and better known two- and multi-personal games. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria gier; Dobra publiczne; Zaufanie; Zachowania społeczne; Gra Ultimatum

EN

Game theory; Public goods; Trust; Social behaviour; Ultimatum game

• Czasopismo: Decyzje
• Rocznik: 2007
• Numer: nr 8
• Strony: 27--52

Twórcy

autor

Szymon Czarnik

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie

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