Przyczyny korupcji w krajach postkomunistycznych

• Autorzy: Łukasz Goczek

Warianty tytułu

The Causes of Corruption in Postcommunist Countries

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Artykuł ten przedstawia badanie empiryczne przyczyn korupcji w krajach postkomunistycznych. W tym kontekście główne kontrowersje dotyczą oceny relatywnej wagi wpływu ekonomicznych czynników strukturalnych oraz czynników dotyczących wyboru odpowiedniej polityki gospodarczej na obecny poziom korupcji. Badanie to wykonano poprzez testowanie dwóch głównych hipotez dotyczących źródeł korupcji w omawianym regionie. Pierwsza hipoteza zakłada, że obecna skala zjawiska ma źródło we wspólnej dla tych krajów komunistycznej przeszłości, zwłaszcza w instytucjach i normach poprzedniego systemu gospodarczego. Głównym argumentem stojącym za takim rozumowaniem jest duże podobieństwo we wzorcach występowania korupcji w regionie. Różnice w jej poziomie można wytłumaczyć stopniem zaawansowania wprowadzania systemu komunistycznego w poszczególnych krajach oraz stopniem ich rozwoju gospodarczego. Druga hipoteza przedstawia błędy w processie transformacji jako główne przyczyny wysokiego poziomu korupcji w regionie. Kraje regionu są podatne na korupcję nie tylko z powodu dziedzictwa komunizmu, lecz również z powodu podatności polityki gospodarczej w trakcie transformacji na wpływy grup nacisku. Główne argumenty wspierające tę tezę dotyczą możliwych błędów związanych z przedwczesnym zastopowaniem reformowania i prywatyzacji, które zaowocowały brakiem oddzielenia państwa od gospodarki. Dzięki temu elity gospodarcze były w stanie forsować politykę, która zachowała ich pozycję, a sprzeciwić się reformom, które mogłyby zagrozić ich interesom. (fragment tekstu)

EN

The paper provides an empirical analysis of the causes of corruption in postcommunist countries. Researchers vary in their evaluation of how economic policy instruments and structural factors influence the level of corruption in these countries, Goczek says. He looks at the two main hypotheses about the sources of corruption in the region. The first hypothesis holds that the current level of corruption in postcommunist countries is largely due to what happened under communism, including the institutional standards of the time. The other hypothesis is that these countries' transition from central planning to a market economy is largely responsible for the current level of corruption in the region. Both models discussed in the article proved to be useful in explaining the level of perceived corruption in postcommunist countries, the author says. In the first model, Goczek checked if the current scope of corruption has its roots in these countries' communist past. The empirical study showed that the more economically developed a particular country was in 1989, the more successful it was in dealing with the problem of corruption. Generally, the extent of central planning in the economy proved to be the most significant factor, Goczek says. He argues that the level of perceived corruption in a given country depended on the scope of central planning and the resulting market disturbance. In the second model discussed in the paper, the author tries to check if market reforms contributed to an increase in corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. According to some researchers, wide-ranging redistribution processes linked with privatization and liberalization in the economy frequently encouraged corruption after the fall of communism. Goczek's analysis of economic policy choices reveals that the level of corruption in Central and Eastern Europe is lower than in the former Soviet Union. While most Central and Eastern European countries as well as the Baltic states introduced far-reaching economic reforms at the start of transition, Goczek says, former Soviet republics dragged their feet on such reforms. As a result, the levels of corruption in these two regions differ considerably. Generally, those countries that quickly carried out economic reforms managed to arrest and even reverse the progress of corruption after the fall of communism, Goczek concludes. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Korupcja; Polityka gospodarcza państwa; Planowanie centralne; Reformy rynkowe; Kraje postkomunistyczne

EN

Corruption; State economic policy; Central planning; Market reforms; Post-communist countries

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 67--87

Twórcy

autor

Łukasz Goczek

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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