Pyramidal structures in Poland

• Autorzy: Maria Aluchna

Warianty tytułu

Struktury piramidowe w Polsce

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The extensive research on corporate governance, economies' transition and strategic management delivers interesting and important insights into the characteristics of companies operating in different countries. The growing popularity of the comparative analysis approach also enriches management literature as it allows for extended studies on similarities and differences and dynamics of the patterns which companies follow with respect to both their operation and characteristics. Ownership structure with the reference to the comparative studies worldwide, types, forms and patterns identified in companies as well as the logic behind the behavior of different owners constitutes an important theme in management studies. The opportunity to confront forms found in different countries (with the reference to the degree of concentration and shareholder identity) and the dynamics of the current changes help understand the shifts in realized strategies, undertaken restructuring schemes, adopted organizational structures and implemented motivation or reporting frameworks. The paper presents the essential dimensions of ownership structure focusing on its specific form known as pyramids. I t analyzes the reasons for creating and logic of functioning pyramidal structures and delivers a brief presentation of the pyramidal structures identified in Poland amongst the largest public listed companies. (original abstract)

Badania z zakresu ładu korporacyjnego, transformacji gospodarek oraz zarządzania strategicznego dostarczają wielu cennych wniosków i obserwacji w zakresie charakterystyki przedsiębiorstw działających w poszczególnych krajach. Rosnące zainteresowanie analizami porównawczymi wzbogaca literaturę przedmiotu i pozwala na identyfikację różnic i podobieństw oraz dynamiki zmian zachodzących w odniesieniu do charakterystyki i strategii wielu różnych przedsiębiorstw. Jednym z zagadnień poruszanych w analizach porównawczych jest struktura własności, w szczególności różne jej wzorce, typy i formy. Poszczególne rozwiązania z zakresu struktury własności (stopień koncentracji, tożsamość akcjonariuszy) wywierają wpływ na logikę działania przedsiębiorstw na rynku i stanowią istotny wątek w analizach nauk o zarządzaniu. Możliwość skonfrontowania wzorców i dynamiki struktury własności zachodzących w poszczególnych krajach pomaga zrozumieć wdrażane zmiany, przeprowadzane programy restrukturyzacyjne, przyjęte struktury organizacyjne czy nawet konstruowane systemy motywacyjne. Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia różne wymiary struktury własności, koncentrując się na jej specyficznej formie, jaką są struktury piramidowe. Artykuł podejmuje także próbę przedstawienia logiki tworzenia i funkcjonowania struktury piramidy oraz prezentuje występowanie struktur piramidowych wśród największych spółek giełdowych w Polsce. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Ownership structure; Corporation strategies; Strategic management; Corporate governance

PL

Struktura własnościowa; Strategia przedsiębiorstwa; Zarządzanie strategiczne; Ład korporacyjny

• Czasopismo: Organizacja i Kierowanie
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 9--21

Twórcy

autor

Maria Aluchna

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

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