Corporate Governance Challenges : the Case of Pyramidal Structures

• Autorzy: Maria Aluchna

Warianty tytułu

Wyzwania dla nadzoru korporacyjnego : przypadek struktur piramidowych

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The article addresses the specific corporate governance environment in the ownership and control form provided by pyramidal structures. The identified challenges refer to the issues of corporate disclosure, shareholders treatment, board composition and structure, dividend payout and related party transactions. Discussing the initial results of the research conducted on the sample of 100 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the observations revealed during a series of interviews with stock market experts the paper attempts to address the potential corporate governance challenges in Polish pyramids. (original abstract)

W artykule omówiono charakterystykę systemu nadzoru korporacyjnego w specyficznej formie własności i kontroli, jaką zapewniają struktury piramidowe. Nadzór korporacyjny w tych strukturach jest przedstawiony w odniesieniu do wybranych elementów, takich jak kwestie obowiązków informacyjnych i przejrzystości spółek, traktowanie akcjonariuszy, skład i struktura rady, wypłaty dywidendy oraz transakcje z podmiotami powiązanymi. W dyskusji wstępnych wyników badań przeprowadzonych na próbie 100 spółek notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie oraz wniosków z wywiadów z ekspertami rynku kapitałowego podjęto próbę identyfikacji potencjalnych problemów nadzorczych występujących w strukturach piramidowych w Polsce. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Ownership structure; Stock market companies; Research results

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Struktura własnościowa; Spółki giełdowe; Wyniki badań

• Czasopismo: Przegląd Organizacji
• Rocznik: 2014
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 37--41

Twórcy

autor

Maria Aluchna

• Warsaw School of Economics, Poland

Bibliografia

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