Enforced compatibility and control of switching costs in markets with network externalities: an experiment

• Autorzy: Tomasz Kopczewski , Michał Krawczyk , Przemysław Kusztelak
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We experimentally investigate two competition policy measures relevant for markets with network externalities: mandating technological compatibility and lowering the cost of switching between providers. We do so in a virtual market with the roles of both sellers and buyers being played by student subjects. We find only limited support for usefulness of the analyzed measures: our treatment manipulations have no effect on sellers' pricing strategies. They do, however, reduce individual lock-in, helping the buyers to obtain the currently cheaper variant and thus increase customers' welfare. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Competition policy; Spillover effects; Network economy

PL

Polityka konkurencji; Efekty zewnętrzne; Gospodarka sieciowa

• Czasopismo: Ekonomia / Uniwersytet Warszawski
• Rocznik: 2013
• Numer: nr 35
• Strony: 45--64

Twórcy

autor

Tomasz Kopczewski

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

autor

Michał Krawczyk

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

autor

Przemysław Kusztelak

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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