Dualizma decyzyjny w podejmowaniu rynkowych decyzji

• Autorzy: Tomasz Potocki , Krzysztof Opolski

Warianty tytułu

Dual Cognition and Decision Making Under Risk

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W kręgach ekonomicznych w ostatnich trzydziestu latach rośnie coraz większe niezadowolenie z klasycznych teorii podejmowania decyzji w obliczu ryzyka. Wnioski płynące z ostatniego kryzysu finansowego tylko wzmacniają to niezadowolenie, a także intensyfikują wysiłki różnych ośrodków naukowych w poszukiwaniu teorii pozwalających podnieść jakość podejmowania decyzji i minimalizacji błędów decyzyjnych. Teoria systemów dualnych może spełniać taką rolę, gdyż łączy dokonania dwóch kluczowych teorii podejmowania decyzji: ekonomii i psychologii (pozostających przez wiele lat odrębnymi w teorii podejmowania decyzji). Wsparta wynikami badań z neuroekonomii może wyznaczać kierunek badawczy w teorii podejmowania decyzji w ekonomii, finansach i naukach o zarządzaniu na najbliższe dekady. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie teorii systemów dualnych w nurcie Wielkiej Debaty Racjonalności, a także roli, jaką może spełniać w badaniach naukowych. Jest to szczególnie istotne z powodu, że zgodnie z wiedzą autorów teoria ta nie była szczegółowo dyskutowana w polskich artykułach naukowych z dziedziny ekonomii do tej pory.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

Through the last 30 years the members of economic circles have been more and more dissatisfied with classical economics' theories on decisions under risk. The lesson drawn from the last financial crisis only intensifies the above mentioned dissatisfaction and motivates research centers to put greater efforts into investigating theories that improve the quality of decision making process and minimize the decision errors. The dual systems theory may serve this purpose due to the fact that it combines the accomplishments of two key areas specializing in theories on decision making: the economics and psychology (their theories were for many years treated as two separate and completely independent ideas). Additionally, if this groundbreaking theory is supplemented with the results of neuroeconomics research, it may determine the research direction of the theory on decision making discussed in economics, finances and management sciences. The aim of the following article is to present the theory of dual systems from the perspective of a Great Rationality Debate, prove its role in scientific research and indicate its potential implications for economic practice. It seems of great significance considering the fact that the theory of dual systems has not been discussed in details in the Polish economic academic literature yet.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria ekonomii; Racjonalność; Badania naukowe; Ekonomia behawioralna; Teoria dualności

EN

Economic theory; Rationality; Scientific research; Behavioral economics; Theory of duality

• Czasopismo: Ekonomika i Organizacja Przedsiębiorstwa
• Rocznik: 2014
• Numer: nr 10
• Strony: 3--18

Twórcy

autor

Tomasz Potocki

• Uniwersytet Rzeszowski

autor

Krzysztof Opolski

• Uniwersytet Warszawski

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